

would be empowered merely to receive information submitted to it by Member States in order to substantiate their own statements concerning the fulfilment of the reductions in the conventional field which they had undertaken. So far as I can see, there would be no "on-the-spot" inspection or control of any kind in this phase, unless that is what is intended by the phrase -- and again I quote from the Soviet Union draft resolution -- "The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction..."

If that is so, it means that the Soviet Union is proposing that all States should rely on each other's good faith, unsupported by any "on-the-spot" inspection, up to the commencement of the second stage, at which point the vital declaration would be made prohibiting atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. I might elaborate on the implications of this situation, but I think they are sufficiently obvious to us all.

Passing on to the second phase of the Soviet Union proposals, we see that a permanent international control organ is to be established for the supervision of the implementation both of the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the reduction of other armaments and armed forces. "This international control organ", we are told in the Soviet Union proposals, "shall have full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States." This permanent international control organ could not be in existence, therefore, when the prohibition of nuclear weapons was declared. It could not be ready to discharge its functions for some time, probably many months, after the prohibition had come into force. My Government has asked me to underline this point, although it has already been mentioned at least once in this debate.

This concept is far removed from the simultaneity proposed during Sub-Committee talks in London by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Jules Moch. Their simultaneity -- that is to say, the simultaneity of the Anglo-French proposals -- is one in which prohibition would not be declared until the officials of the international control organ had been stationed in readiness to enforce the prohibition from the moment of its declaration. The same principle of real simultaneity is applied throughout the phasing of the Anglo-French proposals -- a phasing which, of course, differs in a number of other respects from that proposed by the Soviet Union.

On Monday, I think, Mr. Vyshinsky conceded that there could be no simultaneity between the declaration of a total prohibition of nuclear weapons -- which might take only five minutes -- and the establishment of effective controls to ensure the implementation of that prohibition -- which he suggested might take six months or a year. During that period of six months or a year I rather thought Mr. Vyshinsky was saying that we would be moving towards effective controls as the permanent control organization was established and trained but for most of that time a prohibition would be in force before effective control had been established. This is certainly a very important consideration in this problem, and that is why I am spending some time on it.