

to effect a peace without vindictiveness. He saluted the soldiers who had "fought so bravely on the other side and welcomed all back as brothers."⁶²

Under the proper conditions, a humanitarian ceasefire can be directly correlated with the peace process that leads to negotiations aimed at resolving a particular conflict. OLS is a case in point. As we have seen, the Plan of Action for OLS stressed the importance of government-rebel negotiations to end the war. The corridors of tranquillity were considered only a palliative measure to bring short-term relief to the population in the south. Yet the "corridors" and the accompanying assistance effort seemed to serve as both an excuse and an opportunity for real advancement of the peace process. In May 1989, the government and the SPLA agreed to an extension of the corridors of tranquillity beyond the month of May and into mid-June.⁶³ In June, the two sides agreed to the continuation of the corridors of tranquillity for as long as necessary, regardless of possible changes in political and military circumstances. They also agreed to hold talks on 10 June in Addis Ababa on how to proceed with peace negotiations and a permanent ceasefire.⁶⁴

The corridors of tranquillity and the associated relief effort have been judged instrumental in paving the way for the peace negotiations which began in Sudan in June 1989.⁶⁵ It is said that the UN relief efforts contributed to an atmosphere of cooperation between the parties in the conflict. In this sense, the humanitarian ceasefire can be viewed as a confidence-building effort, helping to instill trust among enemies. In fact, the Sudanese government and the SPLA both acknowledge that the OLS experience has contributed to the peace process.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 238.

⁶³ "Operation Lifeline Sudan," *Situation Report*, No. 3, 26 May 1989.

⁶⁴ "Operation Lifeline Sudan," *Situation Report*, No. 4, 13 June 1989, p. 2.

⁶⁵ Press, *supra* note 54, p. 4.