

used to initiate tacit or explicit communication between adversaries in an effort to signal an interest in moving away from a use of force and toward negotiation. To compensate for some of the serious weaknesses of tit for tat, leaders can also try to break out of habitual conflict through less conventional methods of unilateral and irrevocable concessions. This kind of strategy tries to send a credible signal of leaders' interest in addressing the issues in conflict and in alternatives to the use of force. We classify these kinds of strategies as general reassurance.

When leaders anticipate a deliberate challenge to a specific commitment or consider a miscalculated challenge likely, they can in the first instance use strategies of immediate reassurance to compensate for some of the obvious drawbacks of deterrence. They can attempt through self-restraint to avoid exacerbating the pressures and constraints that operate on an adversary who may choose force because of the costs of inaction. This kind of strategy is designed to reduce the pressures on their adversary to act. To reduce the likelihood of a miscalculated challenge, they can also develop informal "norms of competition" to regulate their conflict and signal the limits of their intentions. In a closely related strategy, leaders can attempt to put in place informal or formal regimes designed specifically to build confidence and reduce uncertainty. "Limited security regimes" can reduce the probability of miscalculated war. If time permits, they can also experiment with strategies of general reassurance.

These strategies are neither mutually exclusive nor logically exhaustive. They can be used separately or in conjunction with deterrence.<sup>136</sup> Like deterrence, reassurance strategies are difficult to implement. They too confront strategic, political, and psychological

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<sup>136</sup> George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, pp.1-35, first explored the interaction of deterrent and reward strategies. Thomas W. Milburn, "The Concept of Deterrence: Some Logical and Psychological Considerations," *Journal of Social Issues* 17, No. 3 (1961), pp.3-11, and Thomas W. Milburn and Daniel J. Christie, "Rewarding in International Relations," *Political Psychology* 10 (December, 1989), pp.625-646.