

Indian Troops in
Africa.

The dispatch of Indian troops to Suakim is a practical illustration of the power England has to draw on resources of men as well as solid cash. The same course has been already resorted to by England more than once. As long ago as 1806 Sepoys were sent to Egypt from India. But it was in 1877 when Lord Beaconsfield played the same trump card that the attention of Europe was first really called to this dormant reserve force of England. It is not only in Africa that such a force may be used. It has been employed on many occasions in Asia outside of the peninsula of Hindostan. In Burma, in Persia, in China, Sikhs and Sepoys were of great assistance to British troops. Possibly even in America they may yet be of service. In case of any proposed alliance between the United States and Russia as against England in the next great war, the prospect of seeing an Eastern army corps landed on the Western coasts of the Union might make the American anti-Britishers pause. The Western States have been very brave in urging on the Eastern States to war-like endeavours. The Eastern States, like sensible people, have objected very strongly because they know they are very much exposed to invasion and do not care to hear the thunder of English guns from English iron clads lying far out at sea. But the West may not be quite so safe as they imagine, and the knowledge that they may see an Anglo-Indian army corps or two in their midst will do much to keep them as sensible as their Eastern brethren.

Lord Rosebery's
Criticisms.

Lord Rosebery recently opened a new Liberal club at Rochdale, and in the evening he addressed a large public meeting. In the course of his remarks he said that his anxiety as to the condition of England's foreign and colonial affairs "remained undiminished." There was "the old diplomacy at the Foreign Office and the new diplomacy at the Colonial Office." He reviewed the South African question and said "a great comedy of errors was never achieved by any diplomacy new or old." In commenting upon the speech The Daily Telegraph remarked that Lord Rosebery's "criticisms of the 'new diplomacy' were as smart and vivacious as usual; but they were perhaps a little wanting in substance. There is something, it may be admitted, in the distinction which he draws between the diplomatic position of a Foreign Minister and that of a Colonial Secretary; and to the extent to which it holds good its consequences are no doubt important. Broadly speaking, it may be true that the Colonial Office 'has to deal only with its own secrets, and the Foreign Office with those of other people; and that therefore it is unreasonable to expect the chief of the latter department to take the public into his confidence with the freedom and frankness to which Mr. Chamberlain has accustomed us.' But though this observation is acute and ingenious enough as far as it goes, it does not, after all, go very far; and, in particular, it by no means felicitously applies to the particular difficulties with which the Secretary of State for the Colonies has at present to deal, and which largely derive their gravity from the fact that our colonial and our foreign policy—as was made only too apparent last January—may become very closely, not to say dangerously, interwoven." In connection with this matter the St. James' Gazette pointedly observes:—"It is not for an 'old' diplomat of Lord Rosebery's stamp to cast stones at any one. The present situation in the Transvaal is mainly due to Mr. Gladstone's old Liberal diplomacy; and Lord Rosebery's own achievements in Siam, or the far East, or Armenia, do not justify his appearance as a critic. If the 'old' diplo-

macy only allowed us to find out a year or so after the event that disastrous weakness had been shown by our Foreign Minister, then give us the 'new,' which, at any rate, takes the nation into its confidence."

The South
African View.

The South African Review, which has just been received, contains an interesting article on "the situation" in Africa. Evidently the feeling is running very high. "The clouds have thickened considerably during the week, and at the present moment the outlook is as black as it could well be; indeed, the situation has become so serious that it is difficult to refer to it with anything approaching equanimity. Following close upon the news from Rhodesia, of wholesale murders of whites by the rising native tribes, and where at this moment the lives of the whole white population, including women and children, are in jeopardy—following close upon this awful news comes ominous signs of a rising of even more serious import: the rising of public feeling in England against the Transvaal Government and all its works. That the negotiations between Chamberlain and Kruger have practically come to a standstill is obvious; and that it is a most dangerous deadlock is also obvious. The silence which now pervades official quarters is in startling contrast to the clamour without. The English Press, from the Times downwards, has assumed an attitude, the significance of which it would be idle to decry; it is not a mere section of the Press, it is that preponderating portion of it which at the period of a national crisis voices the cry of the multitude."

A Policy of
Truckle.

Our South African contemporary goes on to say that "it is not the mere question of franchise or no franchise for the *witlander*; it is not even the broad question of the whole internal mal-administration of the Transvaal that is rending the public mind; those are important matters, it is true, but they have been swallowed up by developments of a far wider character. It is quite possible that, were the condition of the *witlander* the only issue involved, the tone of the negotiations would never have been permitted to become acrimonious at all, and the few poor sops President Kruger is prepared to throw to the British subject in the Transvaal might have been accepted for what they were worth, pending the inevitable evolution of the State into a real Republic at no distant period. These are only little causes out of which great issues have sprung during the negotiations. Mr. Chamberlain is discovering that President Kruger is totally deaf to all reasoning; the response to his advances has been curt and discourteous; the reply to his moderate and dignified proposals has been a demand for impossible concessions; the intrigue in which it is certain the Transvaal has engaged with Germany has been supplemented by a demand for the abrogation of the London Convention. Broadly speaking, the attitude of the Boer Government has been nicely calculated to lower the prestige of England in South Africa, to excite the derision of European nations against her, and to bring her under the contempt of the civilized world. . . . The fact is that the policy of 'truckle' by the Cape Government has been one of the prime factors in bringing about this critical state of affairs. It has encouraged the Bond to launch out openly in its race-hatred; it has encouraged the Boer Government to maintain an unfriendly and 'impossible attitude' throughout the negotiations. It is not only because of events in the Transvaal than an adamant attitude is now required from the Imperial Government. Is it high time that something startling occurred to bring matters to a head in this Colony. Perhaps