

conscious being be an indiscerptible substance. The same conclusion might be deduced from experience and observation. Men may lose their limbs, their senses, and even the greatest part of their bodies, and yet the living agent does not lose its identity nor any of the faculties with which it is endowed. The eye, for example, is something like the microscope; it is one of the media used in vision; if it be plucked out, yet no part of the living agent is destroyed; nay, on the other hand, experience points out to us that the other powers are brought into more active exercise in such a case, on account of one medium of communication with the world *ab extra* being cut off. This shows that no negation is given to the capacities of the mind by any accident that may happen to "many" parts of our sensitive organism, but rather that a positive impetus is given, sufficient to atone for any inconvenience or deficiency in our bodies to which we are nearly related.

4th. It might be objected here "that these remarks would lead us farther than we would desire to go, for they would prove brutes and plants immortal as well as men." Granting this, what then? This only goes to show that man is not alone in this part of God's creation, by being placed in a never-dying state, since we do not know what hidden powers and capacities they may have bestowed upon them. This attribution of immortality, however, does not include in it the important idea that brutes have a moral nature—a power of discriminating between right and wrong. But the subject is beyond our comprehension. The difficulties spring from our ignorance.

II. Death is not the annihilator of the present powers of reflection.

This gross tabernacle of clay is not essential to thought, nor to our intellectual pleasures and sufferings. Body and spirit may and do affect each other, but there is no presumption that the dissolution of the one must be the destruction of the other.

III. Death does not keep in bondage the present intellectual powers, for the same reasons which have been given already. Death, e. g., may resemble fetal life. It may only be the beginning of a new stage of action, upon which we may play a progressive part throughout the endless ages of eternity. As death does not appear likely to destroy us, there is a presumption that we shall live on. This credibility is so strong, that, laying aside any attempt at direct demonstration, the idea appears intuitive; at all events analogous facts stretch out their arms to futurity, and ask at least a candid investigation.

CHAPTER II.

The Proposition to be investigated is, "In that future state shall every one be rewarded or punished?"

This chapter is divided into two parts

I. IT SPEAKS OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN GENERAL. Under the present government and in the present condition of affairs, there are pleasure and pain, and these are consequences of our own actions; besides this we are endowed by the Father of all, with the power of anticipating that such results will follow actions. Objections,—“There cannot be apparently much wisdom and goodness in the administration of the affairs of this world, if pleasure and pain be allowed to depend on human agency, when God is able to exercise so much power in nature, his goodness might prevent man from bringing suffering upon himself and his wisdom might devise a plan to increase his felicity.”

Answer 1st. The plan might be beyond the range of things possible, for God has impossibilities con-

nected with his nature. 2nd. Less happiness upon the conjunct view of the whole scheme might be the consequent. The sufferings which are resultants of human actions may (for aught we know) be the occasion of greater happiness than the banishment of it from our moral and physical system might produce. 3rd. Divine goodness may not be of that nature as to produce happiness on the good and evil indiscriminately. Were we to argue from his holiness, it would be reasonable to suppose, that he would only desire to make the good happy. 4th. Our ignorance of what God may have in view as an end, may not solve the enigma, but it should silence rash objections. 5th. Whatever solution of the inexplicable problem may be given, facts cannot be thrown over-board, nor doubted for a moment. What are they? All nature is illustrative of God's governing us thus. Our happiness and misery here, in the majority of instances, are placed at our own disposal, and are within the sphere of our own power. To give the rationale for such a procedure is too much for finity, but seeing it is so, the presumption forces itself upon the mind that the state of man, whether of enjoyment or of wretchedness in the life that is to come, should be the consequence of his doings and his character in the life that now is.

Objection. "All things exist and operate by an invariable rule. All the preceding particulars though true may be ascribed to the general course of nature."

Ans. That is true, yet that does not exclude from Nature's dominions an Operator, an Agent, a God, and although there appears uniformity in the universal plan, the conclusion that therefore God does not act at all, would be barbarous in the extreme.

Objection. Does that not imply that because pleasure is concomitant with indulgence in lust and giving loose rein, Mazeppa-like, to passion, therefore, we should drink to the dregs the chalice of carnal enjoyment for God so designed it and rewards us for so doing.

Ans. Foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the passions were intended, as a whole, to induce men to act in such and such ways, not that unbounded license should be taken, for that would entail misery instead of pleasure, but that those things which produce good should be indulged in. Eyes were intended for seeing although there are many things upon which we should not look.

The whole of this part may be succinctly stated thus:—Government implies intimation given in a certain way that man will be punished or rewarded for violation or obedience. God is the great Governor. He does it now, therefore, may do it hereafter. Men may ridicule the thought that small pains are examples of divine punishment, but whoever denies this, must likewise deny in the same proposition all final causes.

II. PUNISHMENT IN PARTICULAR. THIS IS MOST OBJECTED AGAINST. The two, however, are knit together and the argument which establish the one, must also prop up the other. Have we any reason to believe in future punishment? Is the idea not incompatible with the administration of things in this world? If nothing of the kind can be found among us, then analogy must fall to the ground, but there are natural punishments, and the circumstances connected with them resemble substantially the those which we are taught await the wicked in the world to come.

I. Punishments often follow actions, which bring with them much present pleasure.

II. The punishment and pleasure are not at parity: the former is often much greater than the latter.

III. We cannot presume, that because "Sentence