

which, while more effective as yet in the field of political propaganda than actual aid, has, nevertheless, important potentialities for good or evil. These communist newcomers possess very great resources and their achievements and capabilities in technical matters and in the sciences are far greater than many of us realize, or wish to realize. I wish that we could whole-heartedly welcome this new source of contribution to the world Community Chest. The task that remains to be done is enormous and it needs the mobilization of the world's entire resources. We would, however, be happier about accepting the Soviet Union as a new convert to the practice of co-operating with the rest of the international community in foreign aid and technical assistance, if we could be assured that the communist empire would be willing to abide by the rules which are generally accepted by those countries which have been trying to do their share in this field for some time.

Although a late starter in the field, and whatever its motives may be, the Soviet Union seems to be trying to make up for lost time. Already they have made important economic deals with Egypt, India, Syria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma, the Sudan and Yemen. These various offers and proposals have been made with such shrewdness, and have often been so tied up with political appeal, that they have received publicity in the under-developed countries out of all proportion to their importance in economic or assistance terms. The Soviet Union has been trying with skill, determination and irresponsibility—and with too much success—to get the maximum of political advantage from its operations; in certain areas it seems to have gained more popular approval from its more offers than the West has gained from its much more generous plans and its far greater accomplishments over a much longer time.

Factors Favouring the Soviet Union

The fact is that in entering into this phase of competitive co-existence, the Soviet Union has some important immediate advantages in its favour.

Its leaders control vast resources, both human and material, which they can use for political or other purposes without any Parliamentary or popular restraint whatsoever. Their worries about public opinion are minimal. If political advantage so indicated, they could export, and in the past they have exported, food and other materials even if their own people were in short supply. They can, and do, in negotiating trade or commercial arrangements, make loans on easy terms without regard to economic considerations, and

they have provided capital goods at less than cost price. They are also prepared to accept commodities from their customers abroad, even though these commodities are of no great importance to them. Whatever commercial losses the Soviet bloc countries may incur in such deals are considered to be more than counter-balanced by any immediate or long-range political advantage. The Soviet Union can also accept and use many of the surplus raw materials which the under-developed countries are anxious to sell—for example rice, cotton, sugar and beef—while in the West, we have our own serious surplus problems. The Soviet bloc is, in fact, entering into the field of competitive co-existence in economic matters with many points in their favour and at a time very favourable to them.

Scarcity of Technical Experts

The Soviet leaders also have no difficulty in organizing and conducting programmes of technical assistance. Although the Western countries, including Canada, have sent to many countries of the world experts in a wide variety of technical matters, this part of our technical assistance programme has not been easy. It has been hard to secure qualified men. Much has been heard lately in the United States and Canada about our increasing lack of technical experts, and for the need to increase very considerably the number of technical and scientific graduates from our universities. In general, both for the Colombo Plan and for the various schemes of technical assistance directed by the United Nations, we have probably not been able to supply more than half the requests sent in for expert advice, or for students to receive technical training in the West. We operate in this as in other fields on a voluntary basis. This involves certain difficulties which the Soviet leaders do not have. Their technical or engineering experts are simply directed to go where ordered, and to stay there until told to come home.

In this way the Soviet leaders enjoy an advantage in what might be termed their communist missionary work abroad. They have only to decide what it is in their interest to do, and they can then give effect in their decisions.

It is, therefore, much easier for them than it is for us to make offers which sound very generous, not only to send their technicians abroad, but also to train technicians from those countries in Russia. The technical training of these trainees will be thorough. So will the communist indoctrination to which they will be exposed and which may be the main reason for inviting them. There will never be