

	1868. \$	1888. \$	1897. \$
Money orders issued :—			
“ p'ble. in Canada.	2,959,762	8,520,775	10,683,174
“ outside Canada..	323,118	2,395,842	2,304,056
Foreign money orders			
paid in Canada.....	90,579	1,726,011	2,245,467
P. O. Savings' Bank			
deposits	204,588	20,689,032	32,380,829
Gov't. Savings' Bank..	1,422,046	20,682,025	16,554,146

It should ever be borne in mind in considering the cost of the postal system in Canada that we have a population in the Dominion which is sparsely scattered over an enormous area, this country covering 3,515,647 square miles of land, and 140,000 sq. miles of water, the inhabitants numbering about 5 millions. It is 3,500 miles from west to east, and 1,400 from south to north. Canada embraces more than one-third of the total area of the British Empire. Such vast distances involve heavy expenses in carrying on the postal service, which has been so developed as to reach every settlement in Canada, and so to bring all our people into easy communication with each other, and with those with whom they desire to correspond in all parts of the world.

HOOLEY'S REVELATIONS.

The revelations made by Mr. Hooley, the insolvent English financier, have given the financial world a shaking up, the effects of which will be felt for a long time, and most of which effects will be beneficial. Much curious capital is being made out of the affair in France and in the United States. In France the Hooley scandal seems to be regarded as in some sort a set-off to the Panama scandal, and a complete if superfluous proof of the perfidy of "perfidious Albion." In the United States it is welcomed as an ample justification of America's conventional contempt for the Peerage. To the credit of the Peerage though it might be argued that Hooley's prices indicate that titles are for some reason still held in high estimation among British investors. The scandal will not be altogether a bad thing, if it makes investors generally pay less attention to the front pages of prospectuses and more to the merits of the schemes they describe. It is all very well to accuse people of snobbishness, because they favour enterprises managed by aristocratic directors, but the common sense explanation is that the comparatively poor man feels safe in following where the rich man leads; and there is something in the argument in the case where a shrewd successful business man embarks large capital. It is a certificate by an expert that he has sufficient confidence in the enterprise to risk his own money in it. Hence a director's moral responsibility does not stop with his liability. When a public man, be he a lord or a commoner, allows his name to be used on a prospectus without investing his own money and in addition receives large sums for the use of his name, it is not

too much to say that investors who are left in ignorance of these important details are induced to subscribe under false pretences.

The affair will be a warning not only to a large class of investors, but to a large class of "guinea-pigs," as ornamental directors are called. Peers will be chary of lending their names to the soundest undertakings for fear of misconceptions in the public mind, and the public will fight shy of prospectuses with peers' titles upon them. Hooley himself comes out of the affair with little credit. He promised revelations of blackmail, of which he was the victim. His story is a record of gross bribery in which he was the chief offender. It is difficult to believe that the noble lords were such rascals or such fools as to lend their names to Hooley's undertakings, knowing them to be unsound. The high prices ought to have aroused their suspicions, and in any case they are culpable for lending their names to any undertakings without knowing them to be sound. To some extent no doubt, like other people, they were dazzled by the glamour of Hooley's financial fame.

As one result of the scandal, we may look for demands for extravagant legislation dealing with joint stock companies. Parliament cannot undertake to protect foolish investors against their own folly; but it should do whatever is possible to protect them against misrepresentation, and not only in England but everywhere the relations of directors to their companies are very commonly misrepresented or misunderstood. It is the exception to tell all the truth about a new company's capital. The public seldom knows as it ought to know how much hard cash actually invested is represented by the names on the list of directors. It is represented that so much is subscribed and so much paid up; but nobody knows how much of the "capital" is represented by money; or how much by patent rights, good will, contracts, salaries, promotion expenses, watered stock, etc. These things may or may not be legitimate, but the public who are asked to invest ought to know the facts.

The motive of Hooley's exposure is not very intelligible. He has not whitened his own character in black-mailing his associates. He has shown himself to be a reckless gambler with other peoples' money; his idea of commercial morality being summed up in the cynical motto *caveat emptor*.

Not the least service he has done the public in making his revelations is to show that it is not safe to trust him with money and positively dangerous to take money from him. His career as a financier is surely near its close. His attempt to pose as a victim is a flat failure; his own testimony shows that, in all questionable transactions he describes, he himself was the tempter, and the actions of some of the men whose characters he has blackened, while not compatible with business intelligence, are not incompatible with honest intentions.