

interference with national sovereignty. While it may become necessary for all states to accept certain limitations of their national sovereignty in the common interest, such limitations of their sovereignty cannot be required only of some states. In this connection, it is necessary to take into account that a nation cannot produce a nuclear weapon simply by virtue of its having received such plant or equipment. It would need in addition a continuous supply of nuclear material, and moreover, its technological and industrial capabilities would have to be sufficiently developed. If such a level of development is reached by a country, it would be able to produce its own reactors and facilities without the need to obtain them from elsewhere, thus, the impact of the safeguards on plant and equipment would fall on those industrially less developed nations which were in fact not repeat not in a position to utilise such equipment for the production of materials for weapons, while not repeat not affecting greatly the industrially developed countries. It should also be remembered that even if plant or equipment were to be supplied under restrictive conditions, there would be nothing to prevent the receiving country from duplicating such facilities, and its ability to do so would be in direct proportion to its industrial development.

(6) Secondly, the attachment of safeguards to the supply of unprocessed source material, such as uranium and thorium concentrates or ores, is again inexpedient for the same reasons as have been explained in the preceding paragraph of this memo. There is currently a very great over-production of such materials, and they are now becoming freely available as articles of commerce. The Government of India are unable to accept the position that safeguards should be applied to the supply of such material required for peaceful programmes, when large amounts of such materials are freely supplied by some countries to others for military purposes. Several countries, including many of the industrially under-developed countries, have sizeable deposits of these materials, and if onerous conditions are attached to their supply from other sources, the countries concerned will resort to developing their own resources, even if the end product is obtained at a cost which may be higher than that at which it could be made available under safeguards. In these circumstances, the sale of such materials should at the very most be accompanied by an undertaking by the recipient country that the materials supplied will be used solely for peaceful purposes.

(7) Finally, as already stated, the only system of safeguards which would be practicable and effective would be one which envisaged worldwide controls applicable to all nations without discrimination. Until the powers concerned are able to reach agreement on the measures which would lay the foundation of such a system, it would appear to be necessary to introduce a system attaching safeguards only to the supply of special fissionable materials, because some material of this category could be used directly for making atomic weapons. Such a system should prescribe and fix at reasonable level the quantities to be supplied free of safeguards, and accounting and inspection should be required "to the extent relevant" as prescribed in Article XII of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Generally speaking, it may be inferred that if a country is not repeat not able to produce fissile material, it will also not repeat not have the capability to produce an atomic weapon. On the other hand, if a country is determined to produce an atomic weapon and has the requisite technical knowledge to do so, then considerations of cost will not repeat not deter it from producing its own fissile materials. These dangers can be avoided only by a universal ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, under the requisite controls, and by banning the testing of such weapons. The Government of India are ready to give their adherence to a practical and effective system on this basis so as to assist in achieving an effective measure of world security." Ends.

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