

must have been settled before the British memorial of the seventeenth of June was drawn up. If so, why might not Mr. Pitt have intelligence of it, as well as gain such intelligence after? His enemies in the c—— I laboured to gain as much for the French, as possible, that he might lose as much honour by the peace, as he reaped by the war. He opposed the giving up the Fishery, he stickled, he agreed, he knew what was on the carpet, he knew what he might safely do, and he knew what was necessary for him to do, to avoid the odium and clamour his enemies would have raised against him, as being the cause of the continuance of the war, and of the augmentation of the taxes, if he had acted otherwise. Thus he thought he might safely agree to what, he was sure, the French would not accept; and was the less sanguine in contending for what, he knew, we ought to retain; namely, all our *American* conquests; as he knew the French never designed any peace, unless we would resign all our acquisitions, and grant them a passage through our colonies to *Canada*.

But, though Mr. Pitt knew, from the beginning of the negotiation, the French had no design to make peace; and, consequently, that he could expect none, yet, for various obvious reasons, some of which we have suggested, he was obliged to dissemble his knowledge, and to make semblance of an inclination to peace, as well as to carry on the negotiation, in such manner, as if he knew nothing of the French and Spanish designs. His coldness towards the peace, and his shyness to the French minister, which must have flowed from a knowledge of their intentions, make the French complain in several places of his aversion to peace, of the insincerity of the British court, and that he never had any design to make peace, all which are indications, that Mr. Pitt knew their intention. Upon this account they affect to express a great hatred and animosity to him. As Mr. Pitt saw the French chicanery about the Epochs, &c. and knew of the family-compact, and the designs of France and Spain, before he joined in any concessions, he was certain, how far he might advance, without being caught; and hence formed a plan and system by which he might attain the character of moderation, as to himself and country, avoid the reproaches of his enemies here at home, who envied his glory, and waited to entrap and ensnare him; and yet preserve to his country all the advantages obtained by the war, and acquire more by the continuance of hostilities.

This policy is a master piece, a stroke of genius: and this being admitted, all Mr. Pitt's conduct appears congruous and uniform. Take away this supposition, it is all incompatible and absurd, the resemblance of working *Pemlepe's* web, and unravelling