

were the necessary consequence of the neglect which suffered the tube to get red hot.

Sixth—“*The wearing of the bellows.*” I have before explained this matter to the reader, and to save repetition I will only state that Captain Ross knew perfectly well before he ordered the engines, that bellows became indispensable to produce the requisite draught. Indeed, this formed, in the estimation of Captain Ross, one of the best features of the entire arrangement. That bellows constantly worked are not very lasting, Captain Ross ought to have known, and provided himself accordingly.

Seventh—“*The cylinders not of sufficient size.*” The falsity of this assertion I have so fully proved, that nothing further need be said except to remind the reader that instead of twenty horses' power contracted for by Captain Ross, the cylinders were sufficiently large to produce upwards of thirty horses' power each when worked at the speed determined by Captain Ross himself, as the basis upon which the cylinders were calculated and proportioned.

Eighth—*Want of speed in the ship.* For this Captain Ross has himself alone to blame; it was assuredly no fault of Messrs. Braithwaite and Ericsson that the Victory drew three feet more water than it should have done consistently with the position of the paddle-wheels. That the vessel was *impeded and the power of the engines absorbed by the too deep immersion of the paddle-wheels*, as well as the too-confined construction of the paddle-boxes, is a fact so indisputable that nobody with less effrontery than Captain Ross would attempt to deny it.

Having thus explained for what *purpose* the machinery of the Victory was from the *commencement* constructed, as well as the