

Man is ruled by the external influences, from the thralldom of which there is no manumission, being, as Emerson would say, in "the hands of the cherubim of destiny." By the latter it is stated there is no world except a unit of mental activities.

I remember when I was a young man at college reading the controversy which was going on at that time on the theological dogma of predestination and free-will. I got hold of a work of Jonathan Edwards "On the Will." His work is a marvel of metaphysical logic to prove that man had no free will, but was guided in all his actions by the influence of what he called "external motives." Man had no spontaneousness of will, but was of necessity innately created for good or evil. He was good enough to say that we had our life history modified very much by education, experience and what we now-a-days call "environment." In spite of these sunny glints we were doomed to weal or woe because of want of volition; that is how I remember this remarkable book. One of his opponents gave the example of a man standing hungry and wistful between two loaves of bread of equal appearance and attractiveness. The external motives being equal and there being no free will to choose either of them, the man must of necessity starve to death in the midst of plenty. The opponent to Edwards' doctrine of fatalistic necessity fairly argued that the man would soon break through these so-called equal attractions with a spontaneous alacrity which would astonish the New England divine. There was hunger urging and bread was wanted to allay it, so no more equable external attractiveness would hinder prompt choice of one of the alternatives.

Even Tyndall is forced to say "We are woven by a power not in ourselves." Haeckel is forced to say that "Organization is a result of life." Then is life an entity antecedent to its work and does exist independent of it. If that be so in the more primitive chemical as well as the vital forces, then why deny it in the psychic force, seeing it is more complex than these and has in its manifestations new elements of a higher order than aught below it in the scale of being? The contest is over the definition of I. The monist vehemently asserts that all nerve action or function means the living I, yet he acknowledges its existence as an agent antedating the organ which creates it.

This seems a contradiction in terms, making both effect and cause, or sequent and consequent identical. Herbert Spencer is