

Professor McNaught: Yes, that is quite true. One of the most significant American historians, Frederick Jackson Turner, however, rewrote the entire history of the United States in terms of expansion and I think you really do not want me to take the Committee's time to tick off, one by one, the wars of expansion of the United States. I agree they are both very large continental, militarily expansive powers, yes.

Mr. Ryan: Most of the Americans came in by lawful immigration methods, not by taking.

Professor McNaught: I do not think the Mexicans would agree with you, sir.

Mr. Ryan: Well, in some barren areas this would be true.

Professor McNaught: Nor would the Filipino's.

Mr. Ryan: But in respect of Russia, there is this sort of recognized theory of the pebble in the pond, that she has been rippling out and she needs to be contained.

Professor McNaught: You have invited me to comment on it as a historian. I can only refer you to the now vast literature of American expansionism from the foundation of the Republic. It was Captain Mahan in the eighteen-nineties who spelled out the whole virtually imperial theory on which American power has grown and enveloped a very great deal of the world.

Mr. Ryan: Are you suggesting seriously that there is an analogy to be drawn between the satellites under Moscow and the satellites under Washington?

Professor McNaught: I am suggesting seriously that the Vietnamese people probably think exactly that.

Mr. Ryan: A couple of weeks ago, I was in Saigon for a couple of days and I did not find that to be the case at all. In fact, the Americans are starting to secure that country completely. They are going to have trouble along the border so long as the Russians are in there helping the Cambodians and the Laotians and the North Vietnamese.

Professor McNaught: Yes, certainly there is the confrontation, but the Americans are in fact there and doing . . .

Mr. Ryan: The South Vietnamese government and the Americans are starting to win the people over in the south. That is what I found. I was only there for a short few days. I know I am no oracle but it certainly looked to me as if perhaps now is not the time to settle that war.

Professor McNaught: Well, I sincerely hope you are right.

The Chairman: Mr. Gillespie, do you have a question?

Mr. Gillespie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not have the advantage, I am afraid, of hearing Professor McNaught deliver his paper but I have been listening intently and I would like to put a couple of questions to you, Professor McNaught.

A moment ago you referred to the two super powers as being militarily expansive powers, I think probably this is the basic assumption that one has to recognize in thinking about the world order and the kind of balance of power that we might look for in the world. It seems to me that we can only secure the peace of the world based on some appreciation of this idea of balance of power, related to both capability and intention.

You seemed to say at one point—I do not know whether I understood you correctly or not—that you were against all forms of alliances and that you would promote the disbandment of NATO because you felt that this would help to ease tensions throughout the world. Did I read you correctly?

● 1325

Professor McNaught: The essential point I was trying to make is that I think NATO has, in fact, restricted Canadian foreign policy initiatives and that therefore we should withdraw from it. The possible confirmative point that we should then urge the disbandment of NATO is not one that I would make as a formal proposition.

Mr. Gillespie: Did you not make the proposition during the hearings this morning that it would be advantageous if NATO, as one of the military alliances within the world, were to disband?

Professor McNaught: It is my feeling that this would promote a reduction of tension, yes.

Mr. Gillespie: Then are you arguing the case for the withdrawal of Canadian forces from NATO as part of this particular objective; that is, the dissolution of NATO?

Professor McNaught: I am arguing the essential point first that we should have freedom of initiative for our own foreign and defence policy and the subsidiary argument that our best method of influencing other people is to take an action of that sort rather than by simply persuading them verbally.