

clandestine purposes but IAEA inspections have revealed no diversions of nuclear materials that would lead to such in conclusion. Combined with acquisitions of ballistic missiles and an assessment that Iran has the technical capability to indigenously produce an ICBM within a 10-15 year timeframe, the experience acquired by UNSCOM in monitoring Iraq's ballistic missile production capacity could prove invaluable.

### North Korea

On 25 February 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. Six previous safeguard inspections had not been able to verify the correctness nor assess the completeness of the DPRK's nuclear inventory as declared to the IAEA in 1992. The Director General requested special access to two sites invoking the Articles of the DPRK's Safeguard Agreement relating to special inspections. Special inspection techniques bear resemblance to the inspections undertaken by the IAEA under UNSCR687(1991) and that experience would be directly relevant. To date, this special inspection request has not been granted. North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (a right of a signatory state given the proper notification) and more latterly from the IAEA. Following the June 1994 initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and the possible subsequent reinstatement of bilateral USA/DPRK discussions in mid-July 1994, both actions at the time this paper was written appear to be "on hold".

### IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA SCENARIOS COMPARISON

The concerted and successful international response to Iraqi aggression resulted from effective coalition building and leadership on the part of the United States during the period between the invasion of Kuwait and the launching of Desert Storm some six months later, and by the consensual nature of Security Council decision making which had evolved following the end of the Cold War. While there has been no identifiable, single overt action on the part of North Korea comparable to naked aggression, the need for coalition building in terms of support for non-proliferation actions and the necessity for consensus -- or at least no exercise of the veto -- within the Security Council remain essential elements in the case of North Korea's contravention of the NPT and of its subsequent threats to withdraw from both the NPT and its regulatory agency, the IAEA.

There are a number of significant similarities between the situations in Iraq and North Korea as the focus on proliferation threats shifts to regional security. It is from a recognition of these similarities that subsequent actions may be judged. As well, however, there are a few basic differences in these two regional scenarios which caution for discrete handling. A comparison of similarities and differences in the security scenarios of Iraq and North Korea is provided in Chart 1.