

importance of creating and fostering a transnational policy community whose interaction can crystallize and shape agreement around various norms, thus making possible policy change.³¹ But the creation of a transnational community of experts sharing a common "security culture" would by itself be insufficient, since policy change must ultimately occur at the domestic level. Hence one must also engage domestic "forces of change," whether these are non-governmental or civic groups within society, military establishments, alternative political formations, religious elites, or so forth.³² The transnational and national mobilization of non-governmental organizations on the land mines issue (in conjunction with key political actors, states and inter-governmental organizations) is a crystal-clear illustration of this. Obviously, whatever incentives might be provided, or processes of "cognitive learning" unleashed (through training courses, multilateral aid policies, etc.), when issues of power, prestige and budgets are at stake, the potential gains from such efforts might be low. But as the American-Soviet relationship well illustrates, change from within is possible, and efforts to foster it are almost always better than no dialogue at all.³³

Ultimately, any attempt to frame general conclusions runs into the basic point about security culture (and cultural influences in general): all achievements in NACD and security-building are contextual, and all policy initiatives must be tailored to local circumstances and requirements. When well framed, such initiatives will not rest upon crude assessments of what are and are not the "real interests" or "bottom lines" of particular states and parties, but will attempt to see how these are arrived at, and how interests and "bottom lines" are embedded in a broader socio-cultural context that can be used to facilitate (or impede) progress. In other words, any policy relevant conclusions must assume that policy-makers *to some extent* stand outside a specific cultural context, and attempt to determine (when framing policies) when elements of a security culture pose greater or lesser barriers to cooperation, or when particular "openings" can be found to advance a security-building project.

It remains, however, (at least in studies of this size and scope) difficult to disentangle and trace the broad and subtle impact of "security cultures," or to uncover their influence in particular NACD issues areas in different regions. Strong anecdotal evidence and plausible arguments abound, but a more systematic

³¹ Some formulations of this call it an "epistemic community," and a whole host of studies on this exist. See *inter alia*, Peter Haas, Peter Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization*, 43:3 (1989), 377-405; Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

³² In the security realm, see Matthew Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union," *International Organization*, 49:1 (Winter 1995), 1-38. In the human rights area see Alison Brysk, "Social Movements, The International System, and Human Rights in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26:3 (1993), 259-285.

³³ An example of change can be offered from the American-Soviet relationship for just about every obstacle noted above. For example, arguments about "honour" and "trust" as obstacles to verification were put forward by the Soviets, before they grew to accept the mutual benefits of compliance monitoring. In general, see Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, "Constructing the Practice of Arms Control and Disarmament: Cultural Dimensions of the Western Experience," unpublished paper, 1997; Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength"; Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization*, 46:1 (Winter 1992), 101-46.