

contained in Chapter III is derived from the check-list; it is designed as a gauge by which policy makers and other interested readers can assess potential NACD agreements or measures. Chapter IV considers the relative nature of these criteria, citing examples of how they have been interpreted and applied in different and sometimes conflicting ways from agreement to agreement, and by country to country.

The criteria are not to be taken in the abstract: they must be placed in context. To give one example, the evaluative criterion "military significance" has been used for some years in determining whether it is in the interest of a party to ratify an agreement. However, military significance is situation-dependent: in the U.S.-Russian context, where there are thousands of weapons of mass destruction, a militarily-significant violation might mean a few hundred weapons; in a regional context where there are only a few such weapons, it would be a far lower number. In the former case, it would take a significant shift in the military balance for the bilateral relationship to become destabilizing; in the latter case, a minor change in the number of weapons could become materially significant.

This study is intended to stimulate thought and provide the basis for discussion rather than to provide a definitive list of evaluative criteria or to answer every question regarding the application of every criterion to specific agreements or measures. While the focus of the study is primarily on multilateral agreements and measures, the study also draws appropriate lessons from the experience of bilateral arms control agreements and confidence-building measures and it considers "non-traditional" NACD contexts such as those included in peace operations and those motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns. Thus, the set of evaluative criteria produced takes into account the fact that there are many sources of obligations to control arms, however these obligations may differ in nature and context.