

committed to participation overseas, whereas the United States was still a non-belligerent whose military efforts were as yet concentrated on making North America secure. Moreover, American military leaders tended to take more seriously than Canada the possibilities of aggression from occupied Europe.

Under instructions from the PJBD its service members prepared two basic plans for the joint defence of Canada and Newfoundland and the United States—the first, ABC-1 (or ABC-1940) was an emergency plan intended to come into force immediately if Britain were overrun, or if the Royal Navy lost control of the North Atlantic; the second and later plan, ABC-22, was more complete and was intended to come into force if the United States joined in the war on the side of the Commonwealth, as it did after Pearl Harbor. Plan 1 allotted tasks and responsibilities between the United States and Canada but omitted all reference to command and strategic direction since no agreement had been reached in this field by the Board. In addition to the plans already mentioned, there was a revision of Plan 1, the so-called "Montreal Revise", which attempted to fill this gap.²⁷ (Actually there were two plans numbered ABC-22,—a British-American Plan for co-operation in the event of the United States entering the war, and a Canadian-American one providing if this occurred for co-operation in North America between Canada and the United States, which was treated as a sort of annex to the British-American Plan. This was confusing to military hierarchies at the time and later to scholars. To avoid confusion the first Canadian-American Plan was frequently referred to as ABC-1940.)

The revision of ABC-1940 proposed that the United States should have command and strategic direction of all Canadian and American forces in each of British Columbia, the Maritime Provinces, Gaspé and Newfoundland. The forces in each region would be under American overall command with a Canadian sub-commander under him in charge of Canadian forces. However, when American forces equalled or surpassed Canadian forces in any of these regions, the sub-command would pass to the United States. It was also evident that the Americans intended to incorporate Canadian forces in their regional operational commands.

Responsibility for strategic direction would be vested in the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army who was to consult the Canadian Chief of Staff before issuing orders to Canadian sub-commanders.

Canadian service officers on the PJBD evidently without instructions, accepted these proposals after substantial amendments. However, neither the Chiefs of Staff nor the Canadian Cabinet War Committee were prepared to accept even the amended proposals once the issue was faced in the context of ABC-22 which postulated a war in which Britain was undefeated and the United States had entered on the side of the Allies.²⁸ From a Canadian standpoint there were two main objections: it would mean that Canadian forces

²⁷ Stacey, *C. P. Arms Men, and Governments* p. 349.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 350 and Dziuban, *Stanley W. op. cit.* p. 114.