would, of course, require the appointment of additional County Court Judges, but if the advantage of this were not deemed sufficient to make up for the cost, the deficiency would be amply made up by the saving in the expenses of trial, and the keep of prisoners waiting to be tried, without taking into calculation the personal cost to prosecutors, witnesses, the police, the complainants, and the accused, under the present system. Were such local courts established, there would be no difficulty in leaving to them not only the jurisdiction now entrusted to magistrates, but in many cases this jurisdiction might be enlarged. A summary jurisdiction and power might with great advantage be given to the Court in many cases where magistrates have now no power. Thus it might with advantage be provided that, in case of a criminal charge, the Court should at once dispose of the question of compensation, for a wrongful accusation, prosecution, or false imprisonment, subject, of course, to appeal in certain cases. In the case of disputes between master and servant it would be a great advantage to give the Court power in all cases to finally adjudicate, without restricting, as at present, the jurisdiction to the case of servants in husbandry. It might also with advantage be entrusted to such courts to deal summarily in case of slander and false accusstion, to assess the compensation to the injured person, or to adjust all differences, as in the case of assaults.

The progress of law reform, like the building of the projected Palace of Justice, appears at present to be slow. It may be that the plan of so distinct a change as that here proposed may meet with obstacles—that the institution of an unpaid magistracy is one which, whether it work well or ill, Parliament would hesitate to do away with. There is still a great deal to be done without trenching on such delicate ground.

If we look at the present constitution of our unpaid magistracy, we shall find a great deal which might be remedied, without introducing any serious innovation. The Commission of the Peace for every county, including the names of gentlemen whose legal qualifications consist in the possession of 100*l.* a-year in land, has still the *quorum* clause in it, by virtue of which, in old times, Blackstone informs us, the presence of one of a select number of efficient men was required at every sitting, a requirement which, as he explains, was, and is, evaded by a sort of trick, the names of one and all being repeated in the quorum clause. This quorum clause is still efficacious in other commissions from the Crown, as the Circuit Commissions, where the quorum is constituted, not of the grandees named in it, but only of the judges, serjeants-at-law, and Queen's counsel of the circuit. By simply following the same course with the Commission of the Peace, one substantial improvement would be easily effected; and, in truth, very little is required to make our ordinary magistrates' sessions, if not perfect, at least as efficient as tribunals at once exceptional and honorary can be.

There is hardly a single instance where the Commission of the Peace does not contain the names of men with higher legal qualifications than those legally required of, or ordinarily possessed by, the stipendiary magistrates appointed for the metropolis and elsewhere; *e. g.* men who have served as judges of the Superior Courts at home or in the colonies, Queen's counsel and serjeants-at-arms, judges of County Courts, chairmen or deputy-chairmen of Quarter Sessions, recorders of cities, &c. The existing state of the law tends, in a great degree, to discourage such men from acting as magistrates under the Commission.

By the Statutes now in force, no single magistrate (not being a stipendiary) can, alone, transact the ordinary judicial business of a justice of the peace; any unpaid magistrate, whatever his judicial aptitude, is simply placed on a par with the other justices in the commission. If he attends Petty Sessions he may have to sit under a chairman in whom he has no confidence, and find his brother justices wholly depending on the clerk for knowledge of their duties; and yet he may find himself outvoted in the ordinary business and decisions of the court. After such experience, he may probably be induced to absent himself for the future and to leave the magisterial work wholly to the care of those whom he knows to be less competent, who may be very estimable in private life, perhaps even distinguished in society and in public, but who, being without legal education or experience, are necessarily as much out of place on the judicial bench as men without medical education would be to decide cases at a hospital or an infirmary.

By a very easy amendment of the modern legal provisions which have been referred to, the advantage might be gained, of securing, in every district, magistrates at least as efficient and serviceable as stipendiary magistrates, without their cost, and all this without disparagement to other magistrates in the Commission. Thus, on every justice of the peace, possessed of the judicial qualifications already referred to, let there be conferred the powers and jurisdiction now attaching to the office of stipendiary magistrates. Let a return be at once obtained from each county of the names of all persons in the Commission of the Peace so specially qualified, and their names be included in a new commission as presiding magistrates. It might, without any fear of inconvenience, be provided that such presiding magistrates shall have precedence of all other magistrates, and that one shall act as chairman at every magistrates' court they attend. By a few simple rules as to the time and place of holding Petty Sessions, the attendance of one of such presiding magistrates could always be secured, and thus, without any very radical change, the existing machinery could be made to work till a better were substituted.—*Law Magazine.*