

alarm. The first result was the Dual Alliance of 1896 between France and Russia for mutual defence. This gave France some sense of protection against attacks upon her Eastern border, which she had dreaded since 1875, when she had been saved from a second invasion only by the intervention of Russia and Britain. French colonial expansion was at first viewed with complacency by Germany but later with jealousy; and when agreements were made between Britain and France relative to Morocco in 1904 and 1911, Germany gratuitously chose to consider herself injured and war was narrowly averted. These conferences between Britain and France, which settled old controversies like that about Egypt, were an indication of growing friendship between those ancient enemies, now united in a common desire for peace and a common apprehension of the German peril. The agreements were supplemented in 1912, not by a formal alliance, but by an undertaking to discuss in common any threatening situation, with a view to a common war of defence should need arise. No power could justly take offence at this arrangement unless that power was bent on attacking unjustly one of the parties to the understanding. Taught by the experience of 1905, when Germany, temporarily freed from concern about Russia by the occupation of the latter in the war with Japan, had attempted to make the Morocco affair an occasion for war, Britain in 1907 likewise made a friendly arrangement with Russia of old disputes about Persia, Afghanistan and India. Touching the alliance of Britain with Russia in this war, it has been said that "war makes strange bedfellows". But those who criticise the alliance have failed to note that Russia since 1907 has made distinct constitutional progress, and that her new political ideals are largely drawn from England. In evidence of this progress may be cited the establishment of the Duma, the leading position taken by the Czar in the Hague concenctions, his earnest advocacy of arbitration and disarmament, and his recent promise to give autonomy to Russian Poland.

RUSSIA AND GERMANY.

With this attitude of the Czar and Russia, contrast the attitude of the Kaiser and Germany. An examination of German Army Acts and Navy Laws will show that it has been the policy of the Kaiser and his war advisers to increase the army and the navy just as fast as would be tolerated by those who had to meet the bills; that the opposition to these expenditures has weakened just as the plea of national defence has come to be interpreted as national defiance—"to secure the future of Germany"; that sudden great increases have been accompanied by warlike challenges as in 1909 and 1911; and that the past three years have witnessed the greatest expenditures of all. Thus Germany has