

as STOL (short-takeoff-and-landing) aircraft or hardware best suited to northern climates?

Harriet Critchley's recent article in *International Perspectives* suggests ways in which the Canadian maritime forces' role in Atlantic defence under NATO might be integrated with the relevant commitments under various aspects of Canada's foreign and defence policy. As a regional maritime power, Canada has special interest in the assertion of domestic jurisdiction and enforcement rights as a coastal state as well as a maritime trading partner and an ocean alliance partner in NATO. All these needs could be related to Canada's responsibilities in its NATO maritime role. Certainly, the U.S., Britain and France have failed to set Canada a good example in putting NATO requirements first.

I recognize that maintaining a balance among these various considerations becomes more rather than less difficult with the growing complexities of the interdependent world society created by the industrial age. Obviously, the proper functioning of this world society requires the kind of strengthened global institutions the United Nations was intended to develop. In the absence of such a world order guaranteeing the prevention of war, regional coalitions like NATO are necessary. But even in existing circumstances NATO must be based on a certain minimum of consensus. There must be agreement not only about its military strategy but also about its policy objectives, in order to retain cohesion among its members and to continue to command the support of public opinion that bears an increasing financial burden as well as military risk.

At the making of NATO, its Canadian founders recognized that Western democracies were vulnerable to more than military power — to economic crises, to political division, to cultural dissent. They tried, therefore, to provide, in Article 2 and through normal diplomacy, a process for consultation including periodic parliamentary conferences and public debates. Again and again, the Western democracies have shown creative flexibility in overcoming their weaknesses at critical moments on the road to their main goal and in maintaining their security without prejudice to their humanist goals.

Communist ideology, on the other hand, has turned out to be a form of idolatry of the national state, expressed through military and political power. Communism as practised in the Soviet Union has also proved incompatible with the creation of a world order demanding a certain concession of national sovereignty in the common interest of survival and prosperity.

The Western powers have already made repeated mistakes in dealing with the changing Communist threat and have paid the penalty — by yielding Eastern Europe to Soviet military occupation at the end of the Second World War, by allowing themselves to become divided in dealing with the explosive developments in the Middle East, and by becoming divided again over how to deal with China and Southeast Asia, especially over the tragic intervention of the U.S. in Vietnam.

With this experience of the dangers of separating the political-economic dimensions of security from the military dimensions, there should no longer be any question that more NATO consultation is needed on such matters as the headlong rush of the arms race. Militarization is no defence against itself. Ultimately, it risks the use of the increasingly destructive mechanisms that are being accumulated and

stockpiled ready for a nuclear Armageddon.

It is not reassuring in this connection to read the view of nuclear war of the U.S. Presidential Security Adviser, as recorded by Elizabeth Drew in the *New Yorker*:

I asked Brzezinski then about something I'd read that he had said in an interview. He had said that the proposition that a nuclear war would mean the end of humanity was "baloney". He replied: "It's inaccurate thinking to say that the use of nuclear weapons would be the end of the human race. That's an egocentric thought. Of course it's horrendous to contemplate, but in strictly statistical terms, if the United States used all of its arsenal on the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union used all of its against the United States, it would not be the end of humanity. That's egocentric. There are other people on the earth."

There are indeed! But it so happens that Canadians, as Khrushchev reminded Pearson, would not escape the effects of nuclear war in our own homeland, because unfortunately we are situated between the nuclear giants. This fact makes rational thought vital to any Canadian military decision. No one else is going to do our thinking for us and we shall have no one else to thank if we are directly involved in the irrational consequences of purely military thinking.

It is thus essential that the best brains we can assemble systematically review political as well as military trends. This spring, in Toronto, the Canadian Pugwash Group organized such a review under the leadership of Professor John Polanyi. The consensus was that we could avoid war only if we could observe "a deep restraint in reliance on nuclear weaponry of any sort". As nuclear weapons become more intimately woven into military plans and developments in NATO, the chances increase that they will actually be used at a moment of great international crisis.

In a letter to *The Globe and Mail* last March 28, I suggested the need for joint defence and foreign-policy planning. I also proposed that these plans should be reviewed by an Advisory Board on Canadian Defence Policy, which would make an annual report to Parliament. This is not a new idea. I put it forward in an essay entitled "Canadian Aims and Perspectives in the Negotiation of International Agreements on Arms Control and Disarmament" at the time of my retirement from the foreign service. I wrote that piece as I write this article, trying to reconcile my Jekyll-and-Hyde experience of having engaged in military planning at NATO and in peacemaking and peacekeeping at the United Nations.

Quoting Disraeli that "ignorance never settles any question", I pleaded — and still plead — that Canadians should have a right to know more about the rationale of their defence policy, commitments and equipment proposals, since they bear the consequences of serious error or miscalculation. This knowledge is especially important at a time when weapons of mass destruction have become part of the standard weaponry of the alliance to which Canada belongs, as well as part of the armoury of its totalitarian adversary. Efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to control and preserve their tremendously destructive power by a mixture of diplomacy and arms control are matched by their determination to extend their spheres of influence further and further. I suggest that Canadians, in these circumstances, should have more influence in determining defence policy, matching concerns for security with concerns for survival.