

demands in an unqualified way. Bonnafous pointed out that the calory content of French rations was at a famine level and demanded that the prisoners released under the *Relève* should be agriculturalists; that French food transport be given the same priority on railways as similar German transport; that the Nord and Pas de Calais departments should be economically re-attached to France, so that she might benefit by their agricultural surplus; that the land farmed by the German collective-farming concern *Reichsland* in the "Forbidden Zone" be restored to the French peasant owners. He protested against the increase in meat requisition demands over what had been agreed on and said he could only deliver the extra amount if the Germans helped in suppressing the black market in which they took a large part (a point made later by Laval in his speech of the 5th June), allowed the French police to make all necessary arrests and stopped buying meat outside official channels. He recorded that by the end of last November France had given to Germany 40 milliard francs' worth of food-stuffs (presumably since the time of the Armistice), and said she would continue to do this as long as the vital minimum needs of the population were met. If the Germans were to have some of the cocoa stocked at Marseilles, he must have the 20,000 tons of sugar still due to him actually delivered for French children. If he did his best about meat deliveries for Germany, he must at least be sure that the French would not lack bread. "Un Ministre français ne saurait tenir un autre langage..." It was not in the Reich's interest "to see Communist propaganda intensified in France and declaring to-morrow, with apparent verisimilitude, that Germany is starving the French."

The French Committee of National Liberation on the 6th July dissolved Doriot's *Parti Populaire Français* in North Africa, where it had been particularly strong, "as well as the organisations and groups effectively attached to it." Doriot, who in his Communist days had championed Abdel-Krim as an enemy of French imperialism, continued through the P.P.F. to appeal to Moslem feeling, though the scapegoat was now the Jews; and North African anti-semitism found in this party its strongest focus. It was said latterly to count from 5 to 10,000 adherents in Algeria, and in Algiers itself about 1,000. Prior to the Allied landings its weekly, *Le Pionnier*, was violently anti-semitic; it devoted much space to labour questions; it was violently anti-British and its attitude on foreign affairs was not that of the Vichy but of the Paris press, from which it received direct contributions. The party was relatively strongest in the department of Oran, where the naturalised and unnaturalised Spaniards, taken together, outnumber the French by two to one, and where there is considerable contact with the Falange. Twelve members of the party, including the editor of the *Echo d'Oran*, were reported to have been shot on Darlan's order last December. Yet P.P.F. influence did not disappear. It was behind resistance to the abolition of anti-Jewish legislation until the dismissal of Bouni on the 7th March; and it constituted the core of the "Committee of Revolutionary Action," organised by Guilbaud to support the Axis in Tunis. In Algiers itself a member of the P.P.F. was head of the Civil Defence organisation as late as the end of February, and though the dissolution of the party was then reported, the present decision of the Algiers Committee shows that this had not been achieved. Even now, in commenting on that decision, the Paris wireless boasts that "one cannot destroy such a solidly-built organisation by mere arrest of its leaders." It insists that the circumstances that the Doriotists in France itself are enemy No. 1 for the "terrorists" proves their strength. Whether, indeed, inside collaborationist circles Doriot is recovering political influence, which he largely lost in the course of the winter, is far from sure. But at the big meeting organised in the Salle Wagram on the 11th July his party made a new bid to unify "the National revolutionary parties."

Among other decisions of the French Committee of National Liberation are the creation of a French Air Training school at Marrakesh in Morocco; the abrogation of all measures taken by the Vichy Government since June 1940 which involved compulsory grouping of producers and traders. All existing professional and trade associations set up since the 16th June, 1940, are immediately dissolved. Thus the corporative system of French *Comités d'organisations* in Algeria and *Groupements* in Morocco and Tunisia, which was introduced by the Vichy Government and required associations to submit to official direction and made membership compulsory, is abolished. It is explained that this decision has been taken in the same spirit as Giraud's ordinances of the 15th May, but that whereas those ordinances provided for the gradual dissolution of these organisations, the present decree makes an immediate sweep of them all and will allow new trade associations to be set up.

Great trouble has been taken on all sides to emphasise the strictly military character of General Giraud's visit to Washington and he was at pains in the prepared statement made at the War Department on the 9th July to make it clear that he was there "as a soldier representing France at War." He wished to carry on the co-operation based on the mutual confidence which had sprung up when he and the President had met five months before. General de Gaulle's and his sole aim, as co-presidents of the French Committee of National Liberation, was "the defeat of the Axis forces, the liberation of France, and a return to a political structure in conformity with the natural aspirations of our country." In the course of the talk which followed, he mentioned 2,500 as the number of French combatants killed in Tunisia, and 15,000 as the total casualties, out of an army of 75,000—a proof that the morale of French troops was good. He counted that an expeditionary force of 300,000 French troops would be formed including (so he is reported as saying) those who have served under General de Gaulle but exclusive of the units which must remain for the protection of the North African area. Of these 125,000 would be French and European, 55,000 Senegalese, 50,000 Moroccan, and the rest Algerian and Tunisian. (See also "United States.")

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

The German wireless report mentioned in last week's Summary as giving the dismissal of five Falangist signatories to the Cortes memorial to General Franco seems to have been premature. The situation is obscure, but it appears that the Caudillo, much annoyed by the manifesto—he certainly did not create the Cortes for it to become a Monarchist committee—allowed himself to be persuaded by Arrese, Party Secretary and, of course, a rabid anti-Royalist, to dismiss the Falangist signatories from the National Council and even to expel them from the Party. The three Service Ministers then visited General Franco to tell him that not only did they see no objection to the Cortes letter, but that they had authorised highly-placed naval and military officers to sign. General Franco is reported to have taken this very badly, but nevertheless to have held his hand. For the moment, therefore, the five gentlemen are still members of both Cortes and Party. Meanwhile, both press and wireless are putting out intense propaganda appealing for unity and glorifying the Caudillo, e.g., the issue of *Español* quoted in last week's Summary, which attacked the Monarchists, carried an article which was quoted in full on the wireless and which developed at great length in the usual Falange fustian and fiddle-faddle the theme that loyalty to Franco meant loyalty "to the universal function of our Spain." This campaign is probably warming up for the Caudillo's speech at the meeting of the Cortes on St. Swithun's Day. In the present circumstances there is some interest in what General Franco will say. There is no doubt of his resentment against the Monarchists—there are even reports that he is considering recalling the Duke of Alba for his support of the Cortes memorial—but he is not likely to make a provocative speech just before going away for the holidays. The Caudillo has always shown considerable skill in playing off against each other the warring elements in Spanish politics, and it is probable that he will continue to do so, coming out on top every time himself, until external events—for home politics are conditioned by the war—drive him one way or the other. General Franco is very shrewd, very cautious, very Galician, but he is "swollen with the venom of ambitious pride" and, like most Dictators, will have supreme confidence in his immutability right up to the moment of his fall. If and when the Monarchists decide to force the issue, General Franco will be called on to take one of the most important decisions in modern Spanish history. The fact that hitherto he has shown but little conciliation towards the Monarchists does not mean that he will always oppose an angry "no" to every move to bring back Don Juan; but every act of repression certainly increases the bitter irritation of the Royalist groups and makes more remote the possibility of a smooth restoration in General Franco's own good time.

His Majesty's Embassy have been attempting to obtain publication in the Spanish press of advertisements giving the times of the B.B.C. and United States broadcasts in Spanish, just as is done in the Portuguese press. But in spite of what politically-minded Spaniards are beginning to call the "evolution" of Spanish policy, the Spanish papers are still merely a German province, and our attempts at invasion have not yet met with success. The prestige of the B.B.C.

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