

of arms, it is a very enormous undertaking for a people of 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 to enter a country of one-tenth or one-fifth of that population and wage a successful war of subjugation. That reinforces the idea I started out with, that all that we should attempt to do in Canada is to put our forces into a fairly and reasonably secure defensive position. There is another thing taught by this last war, and that is that if you have an equal body of soldiers on each side contending for mastery, that army which has the least efficient and defective big gun service will be wiped out. As a layman it seems to me that before you can get where the small arm will have any marked effect, you have got to overcome the power of the long range gun. That was proven in the battles between the Japanese and the Russians. Every great conflict was largely fought as between the heavy artillery of the two armies, and it was when the heavy artillery had done what it was supposed was its perfect work, that the small arm came into play. I am led to ask myself this question: where does Canada stand in both these respects? A scheme on paper does not amount to very much except as pleasant to look on. What we want is an effective service. Suppose that to-day a call to arms were sounded in Canada, where would we be in the matter of effectiveness; how many men are there actually able to rally to the colours, obey commands and shoot straight if they were called to active service at this particular moment. If you raise 30,000 men and put them into the field, where in the name of Heaven would you get a supporting force of big artillery to afford a shelter under which these men would do their ultimate effective work. Is it not on these two branches of our force that our money ought to be chiefly expended and that our efforts ought to be chiefly directed? So far as we in Canada are concerned if ever we are attacked by an enemy it will be on the land side. So long as Britain retains her power and so long as we and Britain retain the relations we now have—and that will be as long as we live and as long as many generations after us live, I fondly believe—so long as that is the condition of things Canada has little or nothing to dread on the side of the sea. Granted that your British fleet is at its base under the present arrangement, such is the state of intelligence and so widespread is information gathered and so quickly sent, that it would be impossible for any power on earth to send a fleet to operate against Canada before the British fleet could be at our ports to give us effective assistance. That power that could most easily do it would be the United States of America, and from all seeming circumstances now the United States is the last power with which we would be embroiled in anything of that kind.

Even in the case of the United States it would be impossible for things to reach such a pass that she could send a fleet and

land an army on our shores before a British fleet, with knowledge of the fact and with swift sailing powers, would be here to give its proper assistance; and apart from the United States no other nation in the world could do it. Russia is practically eliminated from the Pacific ocean at the present time, and it will be many a long year, maybe a century, before a Russian fleet will be a menace to any power on the Pacific ocean. The Japanese fleet, the United States fleet and the British fleet will be the controlling naval forces there. At the present time there are not any seeming dangers from either Japan or the United States. Britain is in absolute alliance with the one and has a friendly alliance with the other, that of amity and perfect good feeling. Eliminating that, then, it does not seem to me that it is wise for Canada to spend much of her money or time in looking for a fleet down to the range of common sense—what can we do with a fleet? If there is a menace from a fleet like that of Japan or that of the United States—and they are the only two who could menace us—it is absolutely impossible for Canada to put up a fleet which could cope with either. The better way, it seems to me, is to maintain the present relations between Great Britain and Canada with reference to the fleet. If we think we are able to do it, and feel enough pride to do it, we ought to co-operate closely with Great Britain in the matter of naval defence, putting that branch of the work on Great Britain, and making our contribution to the expenditure if it is necessary, in connection with Great Britain, as we can afford to do, in order to sustain our proportion of it so far as we possibly can. I come back, then, to this, that it is on the land side that we must be prepared to defend ourselves; that we can only hope to defend ourselves in Canada by means of a large militia, and that every effort should be bent towards having a large and active militia force, not less than 100,000 at the very least, and gradually building up a reserve behind that. I suppose reserve means men who have passed through drill and service, and are laid off the active service and fall into the reserve line. That will gradually widen and strengthen itself as the years go by, and as the less active men fall out of the active service and go into the ranks of the reserve. That you cannot force; it will be fed from the active current of the militia. But what we ought to strive to do is to get at least 100,000 good rifles in the active militia—well drilled men; not men who have necessarily passed much time in barracks. I do not think modern or future warfare will take that much into account. I believe that under the new conditions the useful men will be those who have resources and adaptability in themselves, who are not unused to the word of command, who have some knowledge of group-