

The house will, I know, not expect me to be more specific today. The first thing is for the north Atlantic council at its next meeting to consider what machinery should be set up for study and discussion and negotiation on this whole question of how best to implement the obligations of all members of the community under the treaty to promote conditions of stability and well-being, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic collaboration between them. The important thing is to get the machinery going so that we can get a better idea of just what is involved in a process of increasing social and economic collaboration amongst the north Atlantic nations, how fast we are likely to be able to go in the course of the next few years, and what difficulties we are likely to meet.

We have before us a task which will call forth all our reserves of intelligence, good will and imagination. It is not the negative, though vitally important, task of containing Russian imperialism. It is the positive task of creating a free community of free states, strong not only in its military resources, but in the prosperity of its people and the power of its free, progressive institutions.

Before coming to my final paragraphs, Mr. Speaker, and I apologize for trespassing on the patience of the house for so long, I should like to say a few words in closing this survey on a subject upon which I have already touched. I believe, however, that it is so important it needs further mention. It colours all these specific problems about which I have talked. It is the subject of communism and Russian imperialism and its relationship to these problems. I think it is important to understand what we are fighting against in the cold war. We of the free democracies are not fighting progress or social reform; we are not seeking to restore or to perpetuate feudal regimes or outworn dogmas. We recognize the need for change in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world. We do not, however, want the underprivileged of the world to follow the paths which the unhappy people of Russia and of the satellite states have been forced to follow by their masters in the Kremlin.

It is the Russian state, under the control of these masters, which practises at home and exports abroad the reactionary system of society which I have attempted to describe, while pretending at "peace congresses" and in the United Nations that it alone is ready to disarm; it alone is ready to prohibit the atomic bomb and that it alone is the true champion of world peace. The record does not support any such pretension.

I should like for a few moments to point to one very important chapter in that record which will show how far Russia's pretensions depart from Russia's performance. I am referring to the efforts which we are now making to control the use of atomic energy so it will never be used for anything but peaceful purposes. There is no question before the world today in any way comparable with this one in its importance. The Russians admit this. They talk loudly, especially at Lake Success--and I have had to listen to their talks a great deal in the last six weeks --about immediate and unqualified outlawing of the atom bomb, but they refuse to participate in any scheme in which international control and inspection would be effective and adequate for that purpose. Without such control, pledges and protocols would, in the present atmosphere of international suspicion and mistrust, be worse than useless. They would be dangerous, by providing a false facade of security behind which the aggressor could develop his evil plans. We had some experience of this in the 1930's.

The Russian delegates at the United Nations meetings keep on saying; we accept international inspection and adequate control; we agree that international inspectors should be able to visit declared Russian production facilities "periodically" and be granted permission to make "special" searches if the inspectors could show that there were grounds for suspecting either the presence of an undeclared plant in their territories or the diversion from one of the declared plants of clandestine production while the inspectors were away. But what they did not say and what they would not explain to us in answer to specific questions, was how the rest of the world was to find out anything more about atomic plants inside Russia than the Russians chose to tell us, or how inspectors