

Finally, recognition of the Musharraf government would be a small but significant incentive, and an important first step towards enabling Pakistan under military governance to work with the international community. It may be necessary that, despite traditional Western distaste for such governments, the West appreciate the unique circumstances of Pakistan, and learn to work with military governments rather than vilifying them. There is no other option if one wishes to work seriously with the Pakistanis.

External incentives to elicit Pakistani cooperation on nuclear issues are not numerous, due largely to the fact that Pakistan is less interested in its role on the world stage and answering the Indian threat than in resolving its burgeoning social problems. However, considerable progress could be made if Islamabad and New Delhi could be brought to an accommodation on Kashmir. Any government contemplating a diplomatic intervention, however, would do well to recognize the very real historical, ethnic and religious grievances at play, and be prepared to invest heavily in seeking an equitable solution. The Kashmiri question is not susceptible to a quick-fix solution.

Further external incentives include mitigating the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan which, if the country's social condition fails to improve in the near term, may gain a sufficient popular following to form a governing party. The prospect of a second and larger Iran – this one armed with nuclear weapons – is not pleasant and is a source of very real consternation for New Delhi. Like much religious extremism, Islamic fundamentalism can be seen in large part as the result of poverty, conflict and ignorance, and thus can only be treated by improving the social conditions by which it is engendered. This brings us back to the question of conflict resolution and financial assistance, implying working with the Musharraf government.

In order to fully engage Islamabad in any prospective counter-proliferation efforts, it is vital that the international community deal with Pakistan as it deals with India. The experience, for example, of the Pressler Amendments prohibiting military sales to Pakistan was a prime example of the unbalanced and ideologically-motivated use of punitive measures, while failing to apply similar sanctions to equally guilty states world-wide. Regardless of the rationale underlying the inequitable application of sanctions, Pakistanis invariably interpret such actions as being discriminatory in nature. At all costs, in dealing with India and Pakistan, the international community must not use "sticks" with one and "carrots" with the other.

It must be remembered that in addition to official motivators for obtaining nuclear weapons, states develop non-official motivators for retaining them. Psychological, political, bureaucratic, economic and scientific constituencies tend to spring up around nuclear weapons policies, programmes, industries and stockpiles, and these constituencies in turn resist reducing or eliminating those stockpiles. State-specific internal factors will play an important role in any arms control activities in the region, and must be understood well in advance of any initiatives being undertaken.

Finally, little attention has been paid to the utility of linking disincentives to denuclearization. The use of disincentives has been a hallmark of "forced denuclearization" programs to date only where the target state has committed a grave international transgression (and has therefore justified,