

negotiations. In general, they did not object to their exclusion."⁶

There was, accordingly, little reason to look for factors beyond trade policy itself for the rationale for new trade negotiations.

The Dillon Round (1961-1962)

The Dillon Round⁷ stands out as something of a *sui generis* event. This round started out largely to settle a number of issues related to the formation of two preferential trade arrangements in Europe: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).⁸

The negotiations undertaken in the context of this round were marked by a weak U.S. negotiating authority. This reflected, in the first instance, the limitations of the 1958 extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.⁹ More deeply, it also seems to have reflected a rather complacent attitude toward trade policy pressures. For example, the Haberler Report, issued in 1958 by a number of eminent

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ The round was named for C. Douglas Dillon who, as the U.S. Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, suggested its launch. Dillon later served as Treasury Secretary in the Kennedy Administration.

⁸ Specifically, the negotiations were intended to resolve claims arising under GATT article XXIV:6 with respect to the just-created EEC, as well as to examine the Article XXIV consistency of the EEC and the EFTA which had been established by the West European countries that had chosen not to join the EEC. Both exercises ended inconclusively, setting the precedent for future such investigations of consistency of regional free trade arrangement with Article XXIV, which specifies the conditions under which such arrangements comport with multilateral rules.

⁹ For a discussion of the context, see Michael M. Hart, *Fifty Years of Canadian Statecraft: Canada at the GATT 1947-1997* (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1998), p. 74.