

In terms of the possible impact of this issue upon other Open Skies negotiations, much will depend on the nature of the regime being sought. The way in which the parties resolve the related questions of aircraft ownership and sensor quality will also have a substantial impact. If the parties to any regional agreement elect to establish an organization or to ask a third party to perform the flights on their behalf, for example, they will have to decide if that organization is to also process the data, and to make arrangements for it to be shared (these questions will be discussed in greater detail in the next section). Generally speaking, the experience of the recent negotiations would seem to indicate that an Open Skies regime which is devoted to confidence-building, and to warning against large-scale military activities which might be threats, is amenable to some form of data-sharing.

QUOTAS

The question of the quota of overflights which each participant in the regime has to bear was one of the most complex of the recent negotiation. Much of this complexity was the result of political factors which were unique to Europe when the negotiations began in early 1990. The most important of these was the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as an alliance.

This dissolution meant that the bloc-to-bloc approach to deciding upon quotas could not be used. Such an approach would have assigned each nation a passive quota of overflights, stipulated that nations within the same group could not overfly each other (to prevent them using up each other's passive quota) and left it to the nations of the other group to decide amongst themselves who would overfly whom. This approach was used in the Stockholm Document of 1986. It soon became clear, however, that, with the dissolution of the WTO, this approach no longer reflected the reality of the changing security environment.

The difficulty which the negotiators had in determining how many overflights each nation would be subjected to on a yearly basis will also be relevant to other regions. Initially, the Western states proposed a large number of overflights. In the end, a compromise was struck involving Russia's acceptance of substantially more flights than the USSR had proposed, but far less than the NATO countries had originally asked for. The compromise was made possible largely as a result of the clear acceptance of Open Skies as a confidence-building regime.

In terms of other regions in which Open Skies might be applied, the participants to future negotiations will have to