

First, present Congressional restraints limit the deployment of the MX missiles to 50, although there is an important caveat which states that further deployment will be considered if a satisfactory alternative basing mode for the MX is devised.²³ Calculations indicate that despite their accuracy and firepower 50 MX would have only a marginal effect on the counter-force capability of the US. The situation changes considerably, however, if 100 MX were deployed, as illustrated below in Example 9 and 11.

Second, the US plans to deploy the Trident II SLBM (also called the Trident D-5) in late 1989.²⁴ The Trident D-5 makes a qualitative change in the nature of the SLBM force, since its remarkable accuracy (it has a CEP of 100 metres) makes it a powerful counter-force weapon. The calculations in Examples 10, 11 and 12 indicate the effect of the D-5 when introduced into a counter-force scenario.

In example 8, for illustrative purposes it is assumed that 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads each (1,000 warheads) are single targeted against 1,000 Soviet missile silos,

Example 8

MX CEP	=	0.066
MX SSKP	=	0.95 (H=2,000 psi)
OAR	=	0.80
TKP	=	(0.95)(0.80)
	=	0.76
	=	76%
Probability of Survival	=	24%

76% or 760 of the MX warheads could be expected to hit and destroy their targets.

²³ See "Senate Armed Services Committee Votes for 21 Further MX Missiles" New York Times April 3, 1985; S.V. Roberts, "Senate's Chiefs and President in MX Accord" New York Times May 24, 1985

²⁴ J.B. Schultz "Ballistic Missile Guidance" Defense Electronics, September 1984, p. 58; C. Mohr "US. Nuclear Forces: Arsenal Will Be Stronger But Strategy Won't Change" New York Times July 6, 1985