Part 2. Some Specific Considerations

The preceding part of this study examined some general factors in the operations of the IAEA which could be relevant to a chemical weapons verification agency. This part looks at a variety of more specific considerations relating to the details of the IAEA's operations. It is divided into three sections: (1) the Agency's relations with states, (2) the internal functioning of the Agency, and (3) the safeguards systems considered in more technical and detailed terms. It should be noted that these distinctions are somewhat arbitrary for at least some issues.

IAEA Relations with States

Safeguards, Membership, Functions and Financing

Safeguards are paid for out of the regular budget of the IAEA. The financing of safeguards is complicated by two factors: the Agency's membership policy and the multiple functions of the Agency.

Membership in the Agency is neither sufficient nor necessary for the application of safeguards: the Agency derives its safeguards mandate from other sources (e.g., as a condition of its assistance, through unilateral submission by a state, under the terms of a multilateral agreement, etc.). A distinction may be made, however, between members and non-members in allocating safeguards expenses. Under INFCIRC/153, the Agency and members each bear their own expenses, while complete reimbursement of Agency expenses is normally expected of non-members. There is thus a mild financial incentive for a state to become a member. While it might seem natural and obvious for a verification body created by a chemical weapons convention to apply its verification activities only to members, the possibility of other arrangements should be noted and their implications considered (whether financial, as here, or in terms of the character of safeguards applied).

A more significant problem in financing safeguards stems from the multiple functions of the Agency. The Agency's technical assistance and safeguards functions have different priorities among its members. The growth of the safeguards budget relative to that for technical assistance, as the Agency's verification activities developed under the NPT, has been an ongoing source of political contention. That technical assistance is paid for by voluntary contributions while safeguards form part of the Agency's regular expenses is also an issue. Various devices have been used to dampen this controversy. Voluntary contributions to technical assistance have been increased as a quid pro quo for increased safeguards expenditures. Extrabudgetary contributions to