

day and hearing the latest speculations from various embassies, are loaded down with ideas, but I don't see a heck of a lot of evidence of it. Certainly what the Canadian government has been attempting to do in this area doesn't suggest to me that this reflective thought of a very high quality is there. And you know, something in the back of my mind tells me that it may have to do with the academy – that we are not doing a very good job in the universities in responding to this.

My own suspicion is that when the dust settles on this we will have a kind of concert system in the European theatre and that middle powers won't be admitted; we will be right back to the kind of problem that External Affairs was so preoccupied with toward the end of the Second World War, which was how to prevent that. And the answer was the UN.

Thériault: It is a very thoughtful observation that if you don't have power you have to have ideas. And that has explained, historically, the disproportionate influence of a lot of small countries. But in order to promote these ideas, as you imply, you have to have respectability, and the appalling job that our political leaders have done in managing our economy, and the more recent mismanagement of our defence policy, has really hurt our credibility in the Western world.

Morton: Well, I wore my NDP pin today so I wouldn't be accused of defending the present government, and I won't, but I must say as I thought about what you all were saying about our present awful state, I kept thinking of 1945 when we had William Lyon MacKenzie King, who was generally agreed to be dreadful, unimaginative, awful, and suppressed every decent idea that came near him – he now looks quite good, as a matter of fact.

We did have respect, in 1945, to back up the ideas that were undoubtedly generated by a small brilliant group in External – many of them out of academe – many of them immensely overworked, incredibly overworked, by present standards. We also, incidentally, had a huge debt, but nobody seemed to worry about it as much. And the world also was in process of change, but large chunks of it were *tabula rasa*. I just want to remind you that leaders always look rotten at the time, and look better in retrospect.

Thériault: Could I say just a quick word about this word sovereignty? It has become a nervous reflex with Canadians – an emotionally charged word. I can't recall hearing any of my colleagues in the alliance ever talking about sovereignty with respect to Belgium or the Netherlands or Norway. I think sovereignty is a *sine qua non* of the nation state and unless

someone else is after a piece of your territory, your waters, you really don't have a sovereignty problem.

Stairs: If you want to start with the premise that our navy is not about beating up other navies, then what is it about? The answer is we do have regulatory regimes that control the fisheries, pollution, marine navigation, immigration and so on. I don't really need a very large ship, but the north Atlantic in January in a gale is a pretty rough place, you have to have a big enough ship for that, and it has to be a ship of state. Which means it has to be grey or



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red, with a white stripe. And it has to have a Canadian flag and it may have to have a machine gun on the fore deck. Not that you are going to hurt anybody with the machine gun, particularly, but you don't want somebody else being unpleasant to you without realizing that they're attacking a ship of state.

Morton: I suppose the word sovereignty interferes with our rationality in Canada because there is the common argument that we are only defending the United States, let them do it. They are richer, more nervous and neurotic about defence than we are. We could save the eleven billion dollars. The answer is, of course, that they might defend us out of house and home. They mightn't go home when they've finished. And therefore we have to, for sovereignty reasons, show our flag so that, as Mr. Clark said to a chorus of boos from all sorts of people, it should be our submarines put there in lieu of, or as well as, theirs. Well, the boos carry in this occasion, perhaps wisely, but

I think sovereignty is one of the justifications, and has been consistently, for having Canadian Armed Forces and Canadian defence policies.

Hill: Do you think that Canada might withdraw all forces [from Europe] in the next ten years, or should we keep some niche there for our own reasons, whatever they might be?

Stairs: If you can do it without serious disadvantage to your other objectives and without causing diplomatic unhappiness with people whom we are trying to maintain close contact with, then why not. Because, otherwise, it is a waste of money. If we want to maintain the kind of presence in Europe that I think that we really want to maintain, we are doing it in the wrong way.

The simple fact is that we do none of the elementary things that you want to do in your society, if you are going to sustain a serious strategy of multilateralism. How many Canadians know any German? If I were the federal government, and very serious about having a Canadian presence in Europe, I would be pouring money into languages, area studies. I am talking about a major attempt to train a cadre of Canadians who can service the foreign service, industry, the press, and a variety of other points where access can be cultivated in a meaningful way.

Thériault: There was an interesting question that was raised in the beginning of our discussion, as to the "how." The military are so institutional in their outlook that it is a tendency that really has to be checked. I think sometimes we have adopted the worst characteristics of the British military tradition, but we have somehow missed their strength.

For example, we are just now putting major resources in a whole new generation of naval capability. Technically it is optimized to anti-submarine warfare and to the sea lanes of communication. Yet, I would suggest that conceptually, this whole Atlantic defence strategy has been, to a significant degree, overtaken by events. The idea of the long sustained warfare that requires the trans-Atlantic bridge of World War II, is very difficult to sustain in pure logic, and yet that is driving some of our latest defence programmes.

We need to focus much more intently on very sound concepts that should underlie our future defence arrangements, and that suggests to me that it should be undertaken from without the defence department, if we are going to get some more objective answers. I think that the '87 paper, unfortunately, demonstrated very vividly that the department has a great deal of difficulty coming to grips with these issues. □