

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/CW/WP.286

11 April 1990

Original: ENGLISH

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## Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

### AUSTRALIA

#### Ad Hoc Verification

#### Discussion Paper

1. Delegations have long been concerned that the verification régimes of the draft Chemical Weapons Convention do not deal adequately with the facilities that could be misused for chemical weapons production, but do not produce one of the commercial chemicals specified on the Schedules in the Convention. For that reason, earlier proposals have been made by both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom for ad hoc verification (documents CD/CW/WP.183, 210 and 232). These two approaches, while based on a common underlying concern, provide different ways for ameliorating the concern.
2. This paper has developed from a series of discussions of the problem undertaken by Western Group delegations and while not representing the views of any one delegation puts forward for consideration an approach to ad hoc verification which attempts to combine the strongest elements of the proposals of both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. The proposed approach attempts to preserve the best features of both approaches and provide the most effective verification at the lowest cost and the lowest risk to sensitive military and commercial information.
3. The approach recognizes that provisions for ad hoc verification and challenge inspection complement each other and can be developed in parallel. Some refinement and additions to the provisions for ad hoc verification might eventually be necessary, based on the final form of Article IX of the Convention. Also a number of the elements of this approach need to be developed further, such as the level of the inspection quota and the criteria for inclusion of a chemical production facility on the proposed Register.