

tary exercises from more threatening actions and they serve as a reasonable and constructive basis upon which to build more demanding and extensive agreements. As is the case with most CBM proposals, they are useful to the degree that they can be reliably verified. Combined with some closely related "constraint" CBM proposals discussed later in this chapter (i.e. maximum manoeuvre sizes, geographic limitations, exercise duration limits and activity limitations), notification measures can effectively reduce concerns about surprise attack.

2. **Notification of Aggregate Manoeuvres.**

Related to the previous category, these proposals extend the idea of manoeuvre notification to combinations of smaller exercises conducted concurrently or in close succession. The proposals seek to close a potential loophole that would permit the fractionation of large manoeuvres. Aggregate floors range through the same general limits as suggested for single exercises (i.e. 25,000 to 10,000 troops). The same requirements for detailed notification information and advance warning could be applied to these proposals as well.

3. **Notification of Naval Manoeuvres.** This type of proposal attempts to extend the idea of ground force notification to naval exercises. Although such proposals are less well developed than proposals dealing with ground forces, the principle underlying them is the same. States or alliances conducting naval exercises in the vicinity of other states' territorial waters would give prior notification of such exercises along with details of the exercise including its duration, composition and location. These proposals are similar in some respects to existing maritime practice where advance warning of military tests is now provided. Other proposals call for prior notification of "large" naval manoeuvres, presumably in larger geographic areas. The somewhat ambiguous agreement reached at the Madrid Follow-up has opened the way for the consideration of naval manoeuvre CBMs but the actual geographic extent of the notification limits has yet to be determined. The more likely and useful limit will probably be ocean areas adjoining the European landmass out to a specific distance (perhaps 500 kilometers). The importance of mari-

time manoeuvre pre-notification measures derives from two separate naval capabilities. First, either the Warsaw Pact or NATO (but predominantly NATO) can bring to bear substantial quick-reaction long-range firepower in the form of carrier-based aircraft. Second, rapid and flexible force projection is possible through the use of amphibious manpower. This is probably a capability that NATO fears more than does the Warsaw Pact. Both basic types of capability are potentially destabilizing. Notification of manoeuvres involving such capabilities would doubtless reinforce existing and proposed land force-oriented proposals. The concern about amphibious military forces is sufficient that several proposals have sought to address it specifically. One suggestion considers the presence of 10 major amphibious warfare vessels or 5,000 amphibious troops in a manoeuvre sufficient to warrant separate notification.

4. **Notification of Air Force Manoeuvres.** This

type of CBM proposal is also relatively undeveloped compared with the ground force type. Again, the idea is to provide prior notice of and basic information about air force exercises beyond a certain size. This is regarded as being particularly important because of the speed with which modern military aircraft can attack targets far to the rear. The typical reaction time for air defence crews in Europe is never more than minutes, which makes large-scale air force exercising a potentially destabilizing activity. Because of the crucial role that air forces play in the military plans of both alliances, the manoeuvres themselves must take place. As with other manoeuvres, CBMs must attempt to clarify as unambiguously as possible the status of such exercises, distinguishing them from actual attacks. One suggestion places the floor or threshold for notification at 50 aircraft. Notification measures combined with constraint measures (such as Alford's suggestion of rear basing for all attack aircraft) would significantly reduce concerns about surprise air attack which is clearly one of the dominant functions CBMs should serve. When existing and refined ground force Confidence-Building Measures are combined with possible measures designed to notify (and modestly constrain) air and

