conferred by the Act; and sec. 6 was designed to prevent the vesting in the corporation of any spiritual jurisdiction or ecclesiastical rights—such jurisdiction and rights are not to be considered as conferred upon the Bishop of Kingston and his successors in the corporate status which the Act gives them. The action as against the corporation could not be maintained and should have been dismissed.

The society called "The Sisters of Charity of the House of Providence at Kingston" was incorporated under the authority of 37 Vict. ch. 34 (O.), an Act respecting Benevolent Provident and other Societies. The society is practically a self-governing one; by the constitution, the Bishop of Kingston has control over it in respect of three matters only; the constitution provides that the society is to be governed by a Superior-General, assisted by a council of members, and there is no warrant for subjecting the members of this Ontario corporation to the canon law of the Church of Rome or to the authority of the Bishop of Kingston, except in so far as authority is conferred on him by the constitution. The constitution makes no provision for disciplining or expelling a member; and, if any such power exists, it must be found in the ordinary law of the land, and not in the canon law. There was no direct evidence of any express authority given by the society to the defendant Regis to do what she did. A resolution of the council declared that it was necessary to remove the plaintiff to Montreal; but this did not confer or assume to confer upon the defendant Regis authority to remove the plaintiff by force; if it authorised anything to be done, it was to be done by lawful means. Assuming that the society would be liable if it had authorised what was done, no express authority was given, and the law would not imply against the society that it gave authority to its officers to do that which itself had no right to do. See Ormiston v. Great Western R.W.Co., [1917] 1 K.B. 598, 601, 602. The case against the society failed, and as to it the action should have been dismissed.

There was evidence which, if believed, warranted the jury in coming to the conclusion that the defendants Spratt and Phelan were active participants in the wrongful act of the defendant Regis in assaulting the plaintiff with a view to taking her against her will to Montreal.

The admission of evidence of acts committed after the assault upon the plaintiff was not improper; it was revelant because she was entitled to shew what happened in order to explain why she remained, after the assault, in a house of the society, and because she was entitled to shew that the assault was but one act in carrying out a scheme to deprive her of her status and rights as a member of the society, and to establish malice on the part of the defend-