

body of truth which has been established by a defensible interpretation of our own experience ; and obviously if the experience of man is one, the science which interprets it must also be one.

But, it may be said, surely there are many sciences ; is it not then paradoxical to say that there is only one science ? I do not think so. I suppose it will be admitted that there is only one universe, not a variety of universes. We may find many grades of being in the universe, but it will hardly be contended that we can speak of each of these grades of being as separate universes. Why, then, do we speak of many sciences ? We do so, of course, because the pursuit of science demands division of labour. It takes many men, and many groups of men, to attain to science, and therefore the work of the one science has to be done by many men, each contributing his own quota to the whole. Just as many men must co-operate in the making of a single machine, so many workers must labour at the formation of the one science. And there is another thing. As various degrees of skill are needed in the men who make a machine, so the special tasks of the fellow-labourers in science are all necessary, but it cannot be said that their task is the same. For, if science is an organic whole, the parts must be differentiated, just as the parts of a living organism are differentiated. Each is in a sense a whole, and yet it cannot exist except in the totality of these wholes, the complete living organism. We are therefore entitled to say that the one science has many members, but hardly that it has many separate parts. No one

science is in the strict sense "science," because no science is absolutely self-sufficient. If it were, there would be no meaning in speaking of the existence of other sciences. Perhaps we may make this clearer to ourselves by asking what would be the character of a man who had attained the end of science—the comprehension of the universe. The universe would for him be at least an organic whole, in which every part was illuminated by the light streaming from different sources. And above all, even the commonest thing would be viewed in the light of the universal intelligence, which it ultimately presupposes, and without which it could not be. In short, he would at every moment see all things bathed in the light of all the special sciences, of all history, and all the fine arts, and he would see the whole as interpreted from the point of view of a comprehensive philosophy.

Now, of course, it is impossible for any of us to attain completely to this wide and comprehensive vision ; but to some extent we may approximate to it by the habit of continually thinking of the particular in the light of the whole. And this is the great value of the philosophical mode of comprehending things. For it is the special business of philosophy to demonstrate that truth is an organism, and the various sciences the comprehension of each of the organs that in their unification constitute the whole of philosophy. We may say, in a sense, what Goethe says of nature : "Her children we know, but the mother, where is she?" In one sense Philosophy has no content of its own ; in another sense it contains the whole content of