Godefroy v. *Dalton (ubi supra)*, sums up the cases as establishing, in general, that a solicitor is liable for the consequences of ignorance or non-observance of the rules of practice of his court, for the want of care in the preparation of the cause for trial, or of attendance there with his witnesses, and for the mismanagement of so much of the conduct of a cause as is usually and ordinarily allotted to his department of the profession; whilst, on the other hand, he is not answerable for error in judgment upon points of new occurrence, or of nice and doubtful construction, or of such as are usually intrusted to men in the higher branch of the profession of the law." And it may be gathered from *Foy* v. *Cooper* (2 Q.B., 937) that, whatever it is important for the client to know, it is the duty of his solicitor to report to him, and that failure in this respect is a ground for an action of negligence by the client against his solicitor.—*Irish Law Times.*

TRIAL BY JURY.—In the following letter, which appears in the *Times*, Mr. Jelf, Q.C., makes a forcible plea for the abolition of trial by jury:

"Three causes in which I have been engaged as counsel during the past week—two on circuit and one in London—have ended in the disagreement and consequent discharge of the jury. This fact, coupled with what seems to me to be the increasing frequency of such an abortive and lamentable result as this, has strengthened the conviction which has for many years been growing up in my mind that, at all events in the majority of civil causes, trial by jury is, at the present day, a mistake.

"That this conviction is shared by many of my professional brethren and of the suitors is shown by the great number of common law causes (which used all to be tried by juries), both in London and on the circuits, which are now tried, by the consent of both parties, before a judge without a jury.

"The advantages of trial by judge over trial by judge and jury seem to me to be manifold.

"In the first place, the judge must make up his mind one way or the other. He cannot say half his mind is of one opinion and the other half of the other. A definite result is obtained, and it is generally right.

"If it is wrong, it can be set right in the Court of Appeal. Thus the scandal and the grievous expense and suspense to the parties of an abortive trial through indecision is impossible.

"Secondly, the judge can, and often will, say what is passing through his mind. If he sees that the case is a very doubtful one, he can frankly say so, and recommend a compromise which may save hundreds of pounds to one of the parties, and scores of pounds to the other.

"No such collective expression or suggestion can be obtained from the jury. Except by a chance observation here and there of a single juryman, or by the uncertain and often misleading sign of look or gesture, counsel cannot tell what is passing in the minds of the majority of the jury. Nay, more, till the summing-up is over, the jury do not often know how the case is going themselves.