

"order to a proper geological survey, as there are no maps extant, &c."—"The General Mining Association and others have spent much time and money in attempts to win (i.e. to gain by conquest or play) the more important metallic veins, &c."—"The determinations (i.e. the decisions, or resolutions) of this locality have also shed considerable light upon the geology of other localities, &c."—"The age and position of these substances which constitute to wealth, &c."—"If there are any veins of metals, of which a surface specimen appears to indicate one, &c."—"A circumstance (i.e. an accident, an event), of interest connected with this district is that extending from the western entrance of the Marshy Hope, to Sutherland's River,—the part to which I have especially directed, &c., &c."—"It would have been very desirable, in order to prevent misunderstanding, that Dr. Dawson had indicated the course of his line of section, &c. \* \* although as I stated in my memoir to the Geological Society on Arisaig, the arrangement there in consequence of the absence of A, in connection with the mountain greenstone and the doubtful occurrence of B, in the same direction, &c."—"Our coal measures are being worked, while ores for the proper working of which that coal is necessary, are or may be unworked." We fancy that our readers have had nearly enough of this Rev. Dr. Honeyman, D.C.L., F.G.S., &c., &c. ad infinitum. We sincerely hope that the Rev. gentleman's sermons are better composed than his Geological Reports.

The *Unionist* is always blowing its own trumpet. Its latest performance in this harmless exercise has been to italicise a portion of the following sentence from the *Times*—"In the event of war it is clear, that all our Provinces must be placed under one command," and then to say—"This it will be seen is but a mere echo of sentiments, &c.," published in the *Unionist*. No one, we presume, ever supposed that in the event of war these Provinces would not be placed under one command. In the *Bullfrog* of 22nd Feb., occurred the following passage—"In case of war all B. N. America would be under one military leader, and the individuality of the several Provinces would be no more regarded than the individuality of regiments serving under one general officer, or of allies under the control of one Commander-in-Chief." Who ever argued otherwise? Perhaps our contemporary will enlighten us on this point.

The *Reporter* of Thursday last says that at a recent meeting of the Halifax Cricket Club—"It was resolved to communicate with the other Clubs relative to preparing a suitable ground." If the several Clubs be really in earnest, they would do well to bear in mind that every day lost at this time of the year must increase the difficulties of getting a cricket ground in order for the coming season.

### Extracts.

#### THE DEFENCES OF CANADA.

It is not necessary, in discussing the defence of Canada, to enter into any minute calculation of the chances of an attack by the United States. Mr. BAYARD tells us that the Americans have been extremely ill-used by us; that they have a war-party among them; that they hold in reserve complaints to be brought forward at a more convenient season; that Canada lies hopelessly at their mercy; but that they are much too magnanimous to take advantage of the opportunity. Let us hope that the Federals are as amicable as their advocate paints them; but still the question of defence is always this—Can our neighbour sue us successfully at law? not Will he do so? On this principle of "defence, not defiance," the Volunteer force was raised, not only without leading to a rupture with France, but with the best possible effect on our relations with that country. An effective system of defence for Canada is equally called for by Mr. LINCOLN who has the power to crush the colony, however little he may be now or hereafter disposed to use that power; and we have no doubt whatever that, the stronger Canada becomes, the more friendly will be the intercourse between Great Britain and the Northern States. France has not been angry because we declined to stake our safety on her forbearance; and the United States will be rational enough to see that, if Canada is, as they rightly or wrongly suppose, at present absolutely defenceless against them, it is no sign of ill-will on the part of this country to give to her greatest colony the privilege of relying for security upon its own strength rather than upon the benevolent dispositions of a warlike neighbour.

That Canada ought to be defended was not, indeed, denied by any speaker in the important debate of Monday evening. The only questions raised were, who was to defend her, and how was it to be done? Mr. FITZGERALD, in his laudable anxiety to say nothing but what was flattering to the people against whom he was pressing the Government to prepare, was betrayed into a statement which may have a very mischievous effect in Canada. He said—and other members took up the cry—that the Americans could have no inducement to attack the colony except the desire to strike a blow at England. This is the theory by which the Canadians, in their sluggish moods—now, it may be hoped, past for ever—have justified the utter neglect of their own duty of self-

defence. "If we are attacked," they said, "it will be in an English quarrel, and let England save us harmless from dangers which we should not incur if separated from her." The existence of Canada depends on her shaking off this delusion, and it is unfortunate that any countenance should have been given to it by English statesmen, even with the amiable design of speaking kindly of the United States. If ever the party in America which desires war with England should become predominant, we shall find that there are two considerations which make them anxious for hostilities—one, because they wish to humiliate England; the other, and the stronger, because they covet the possession of Canada. The colony, if severed from this country, would be in vastly greater danger of attack from cupidity than it is now from the combined influence of greed and revenge, restrained as these feelings are by the consciousness of what a war with England would be. Without the help of England, Canada could scarcely maintain her freedom though she showed all the heroism of old Virginia. Without the hearty co-operation of the Canadians, England could not hold the colony if her strength were double what it is. But there is good reason to believe that England and Canada, working cordially together, would be more than a match for any force that could be brought against them. And not only is the necessity for joint action apparent, but the conditions of the partnership are almost dictated by the circumstances of the case. Naval defences, and that effective protection which is given by counter attacks, would of necessity be the exclusive task of this country. The actual defence of the interior must be, in the main, the work of the inhabitants, encouraged and assisted by the invaluable support and instruction which a small force of highly disciplined troops can render to a people rising in force to resist an invader. We know, and to some extent the Canadians know also, how rapidly a few Guards' sergeants can convert a mob of enthusiastic volunteers into manageable and effective soldiers; and Mr. LOWE's nostrum of removing the English garrison altogether from Canada can only be justified on the assumption either that the Canadians would be strong enough to hold their own without preliminary training, or that they would be so stupid as to let the nucleus of British troops sent out to take the lead in their military organization. We do not believe in either of these contingencies. The colonists are neither experienced enough to train themselves for a struggle which, if forced upon them, will come with little warning; nor are they so wanting in manly patriotism as to leave a little band of English defenders unsupported by the vast numerical strength which a people of nearly 4,000,000 can so easily supply. Mr. LOWE's scheme, therefore, Canada's part in the defence of the American frontier of the Empire are, is now well enough understood on both sides. The colonists know that the sole condition required to induce this country to put out her whole strength for their protection is that they should do all in her power in a cause which is, we will not say more, but at least not less, theirs than our own. There is good ground to hope that this condition is not only understood, but accepted, by our Transatlantic fellow-subjects as the only one on which it is possible for England to render the assistance which she is very willing to give. After the assurances of Lord PALMERSTON and Mr. CARDWELL in the late debate, no doubt should linger in the minds of the colonists as to the readiness of England to risk much rather than adopt the tactics recommended by Mr. LOWE, of limiting our efforts to counter attacks on the common enemy. From a purely military point of view, it is true that much might be said in favour of this mode of economizing the limited army of which our generals could dispose. But, in war, moral forces are, according to the maxim of NAPOLEON, of far more weight than mere material strength, and the influence of a British contingent on the energies of the Canadian people and the morale of their hastily raised militia would much more than counterbalance any advantage that might be gained by concentrating the Canadian garrison to man the forts. Moreover, the British soldier in the Provinces ought to raise up ten native recruits; and the Canadians will scarcely fail to see that it is only on this supposition that any military justification could be found for locking up our best regiments within the fortifications of Quebec or Montreal.

When once the policy of Mr. Lowe is rejected, as it was not only by the Executive, but by the almost unanimous feeling of the House of Commons, there remains little choice among the measures which can be suggested. Colonel Jervois's report, short as it is, exhausts the subject so far as the principle of defence is concerned. Vital points must be fortified, as the only way of holding at bay an enemy who would inevitably wield a superior force at the commencement of a war. A complete protection of the whole frontier must be postponed as impracticable until such time as the Canadian army shall have acquired sufficient strength to meet the enemy in the open field. But, in the meantime, the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario must be, and indeed must be held by an adequate naval force, supported by fortified depots where it can take in supplies in safety. These are the only preparations which it is possible for this country to share in; and, for the rest, it remains for the colonies to call out their militia, and give them at least the rudiments of military training, before the actual advent of hostilities, if war should unhappily ensue. No one in the House of Commons ventured to complain that the Government had entered upon the course we have indicated; and the only ground for anxiety is the well-founded doubt whether, on either side of the Atlantic, the value of promptitude is adequately appreciated. A sum of 50,000, is proposed to be taken this year for the works at Quebec, and we are glad to find that Mr. Cardwell promises much more energetic action in the second year of preparation; but who can say that so much time will be allowed us, and what evidence is there that the Canadian will fall to work more assiduously at Montreal than the Home Government propose to do at Quebec? It is well known that the great hindrance to effective local defence has all along been the comparative poverty of a new country which has almost overtaxed its powers in the construction of railways and canals. The adjustment of the burden, by which the protection of Quebec and the armament of all the proposed fortifications is undertaken by the Mother-country, will not be thought unfair or ungenerous by the Canadians themselves. But it is not certain that they will be able to raise the funds for their portion of the common work with the rapidity which the urgency of the occasion demands; and Mr. Fitzgerald's suggestion that, if necessary, Great Britain should, by advance or guarantee, assist the Provinces in effecting

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