

of nature. They reduced these processes to the minimum number of fundamental modes, and made them available for reference by the invention of a nomenclature which should at once record and stereotype the results of analysis. A delicate and flexible vocabulary is no slight contribution to the progress of thought.

But the real interest of these workers in psychology lay far outside the borders of psychology itself. Determined above all things to find philosophical support for the dogmas of the Church, it was all but impossible for them to work at an empirical science which touched these dogmas at so many points with the detachment which is vital to the discovery of truth. Thus, their classifications of psychological fact were constantly such as implied a particular metaphysical position. With ready-made doctrines about Essence and Existence, about Substance and Accident, about Causality, about Finite and Infinite Spirit, they could not approach the phenomena of mental life apart from the purpose of fitting these formulae upon them. I do not say whether or not the formulae were valid, but I do say that they have no place in the investigations of an empirical natural science. Their presence there is an intrusion, and it had the same kind of result in psychology as in physics. Just as the work of Copernicus was hampered for so long by ontological speculations about the circle as the perfect figure, so the progress of mental science was embarrassed by the doctrine that the soul must be an 'immaterial substance,' and that as every substance has its attributes, so the soul has its ultimate "Faculties," whose enumeration and arrangement is the great task of psychology. Thus they were everywhere theorizing where they believed