

We can never be conscious of a subjective sense by inception—that is, we can never know how we feel by reasoning.

As the subjective sense always swatches, at the time, the conception which excites it, it often happens that the conception is remembered and the subjective sense perceived at the same moment. This occurs when a conception is remembered which excites present feeling; thus, the recollection of a past danger may fill me with present horror. Here I remember the past danger with a present perception of my present subjective sense of horror. The remembered conception is swathed in the present subjective feeling, of which I am presently perceptively conscious.

In the same way, enjoyable recollections of the past may fill the mind with present pleasurable subjective senses or feelings. Indeed, much happiness comes to us in this way.

It is scarcely necessary to add here, after what has been said, that when a conception which excites is created by inception, we become conscious of the subjective sense only by perception. In this one respect inception is parallel to memory.

Definition.—A Subjective Sense or Feeling may then be generally defined as that peculiar subjective sensory or emotive state of the mind produced by the perception, inception, or memory, of particular objects, and is always perceived coexistently with the conception of these objects.

The mind possesses as full power to perceive its own states as that which may be presented to it by the five senses. The perception by the mind of its own subjective states is, however, often described as an act of feeling—thus, we feel pain, or a desire to possess, etc. In all cases, perception is knowledge, whether we indicate it by its own or by a different name.

The difference between perception and subjective sense or feeling is very great. You can perceive a sense or feeling, but you cannot feel a perception. The one is an act of the mind, but the other is a subjective state of the mind. Every feeling comes into the consciousness by the door of perception, and the perception photographs it in a conception on the memory. A perception takes notice of everything, and notes it down. A sense starts up on the knowledge or perception of certain facts, but takes no note or record of anything by its own inherent power. It passes away, leaving nothing behind, were it not that the perception has taken notice of it and kept traces of it. Subjective sense is just, in fact, a peculiar sensory or emotional stir of the mind, but entirely destitute of conception or cognitive power. Perception or inception, on the other hand, is pure conceptive or cognitive power, without the least emotional stir or feeling. All subjective senses arise on perception, inception, or knowledge, and are themselves perceived and known.

Man is a creature of intellect, feeling or heart, and volition.

Perception, inception, or knowledge, is just the function of the intellect alone, and is pure conceptive or cognitive power utterly destitute of any principle or spring of action that would make a man good or bad, righteous or unjust, diligent or busy, energetic or feeble, brave or timid.*

Man, merely as a knowing or intellectual creature, neither loves nor hates, approves nor disapproves, desires nor dislikes, admires nor despises, acquits nor condemns, chooses nor rejects, is happy nor is unhappy. But though the intellect, through its perceptive, inceptive, or memory faculties, cannot give man these qualities, it renders all-important aid in shewing objects that call these qualities or subjective feelings into action, and also in making known ways and means by which these objects may be obtained or these feelings gratified.

The intellect, or perceptive powers, for example, by their own inherent power, give us a knowledge of love, approbation or disapproval, right or wrong, etc., when these senses are in operation. These subjective senses or feelings arise of themselves on the perception or inception of things calculated to excite them; and it is only on their being excited that they become objects of perception or knowledge.

By subjective sense alone a man is able to approve or disapprove, acquit or condemn. Without it, he can never, from his own experience (or that of another), know either good or evil, right or injustice. He may form some general idea about them from the general parlance of language, but he can never know them as real subjective senses or feelings.

In contradistinction to the intellectual or cognitive elements of our nature, the subjective feelings may be described generally as the appreciative, estimative, or dictatorial elements of our nature. They set a certain estimation or moral valuation on everything presented to them in cognition, and dictate in relation to it. If the feelings, for instance, are purely moral, their valuation

* We do not forget that subjective sense, as shown elsewhere, is an element of perception or knowledge, as well as of the heart, conscience, volition, etc.; for instance, assurance is a subjective sense of knowledge. But in the above general conception there is no need to take notice of the fact, as we wish to call attention to the marked difference between the feeling functions of the mind and that of intellect.