

ascends from the individual to the class, or descends from the class to the individual and (d) the apprehension of the universal in the particular or idealisation (p. 116). Secondly, as no classification of the feelings which has met with general acceptance has yet been proposed, the classification adopted is only provisional. This classification starts from the rudimentary stage of feeling as simply the pleasurable or painful accompaniments of sensation, and, assuming that the more complex phenomena of the emotional life are developed by association and comparison, includes (a) emotions due to association mainly, (b) emotions due to comparison mainly and (c) intellectual and moral emotions (p. 328). Thirdly, with regard to the phenomena of volition, the possibility of a classification does not seem to have occurred to Prof. Murray. Part III, therefore, is occupied with a discussion of some ethical questions. These three classes of mental phenomena, the cognitional, emotional and volitional, are formed out of the same materials (p. 4). "An analysis of our cognitions, feelings and volitions discovers the fact that they are composed of certain simple factors which may be regarded as the elements of our mental life, and that the combination of these elements is due to certain simple processes" (p. 15). "The natural elements of which conscious life is formed are the phenomena called sensations. A sensation is any consciousness arising from an action in the bodily organism" (p. 18). "The combination of these elements is found to be due to certain processes, association and comparison" (p. 73).

A complete criticism of this hand-book of Psychology would necessitate a discussion of metaphysical, æsthetical and ethical problems, only indirectly connected with psychology, as well as of many purely psychological questions. Of the latter attention is directed to one only, the nature of the raw material of knowledge or sensation. "There is a general incomprehensibility in the transition from movement to consciousness. Even phenomena, like light or chemical action, which cannot by direct observation be proved to be modes of motion, may yet be hypothetically interpreted as such. But no similar hypothesis is conceivable in reference to the sensations of the conscious life, and consequently there is here an absolute break in the continuity of scientific interpretation. There is also a special incomprehensibility. We cannot explain why air waves appear in consciousness as sound, ether-waves as light, chemical movements as taste or smell" (p. 26). From this it is plain that as no cognition, feeling or volition can be reduced to a combination or association of physical, chemical or vital forces, the raw materials of knowledge cannot be modes of motion. So far Prof. Murray is, we think, undoubtedly correct. Further, he says: "If in the mere act of tasting, our consciousness is limited to the sensation excited, it may be asked, how do we come to know, to perceive anything by the sense of taste at all? To answer this question we must understand all that a sensation involves. Now, it is true that, in its abstract

indeterminateness, a sensation may be described as a purely subjective condition of mind. But as a concrete fact of mental life, it is a fact of which we must be conscious; and to say that we are conscious of it is merely another way of saying that it is an object known" (p. 119). Consequently the sensation which forms the raw material of knowledge is *not* a "purely subjective condition of mind." A purely subjective condition of mind is simply the abstraction of relation to consciousness, and that is in itself nothing. In the second place, therefore, the raw materials of knowledge are not such abstract relations. Here also we think Prof. Murray correct. What then, it may be asked, is the nature of the foundation of all our mental states? "As a concrete fact of mental life, it is a fact of which we must be conscious" (p. 119). "In being conscious of a sensation, it becomes to us not merely a *subjective* state, but an *object* of knowledge" (p. 120). Such a sensation must be the raw material. Once more Prof. Murray is correct. But we are compelled to differ from him in the conclusion which he has drawn from the above considerations. Notice the following expressions: "Sensations of our conscious life" (p. 26), "sensation appearing in consciousness" (p. 26), "a sensation is a fact of which we must be conscious" (p. 119), "in being conscious of a sensation, it becomes for us an *object* of knowledge" (p. 120). These statements plainly assert that sensation is a mental state or a mental phenomenon. Therefore, the raw materials of mental phenomena are themselves mental phenomena. As a consequence, in order that a sensation may be an object of knowledge at all, all the processes by which Prof. Murray says a perception becomes an object of knowledge, must previously have been brought into play. In other words in order that a sensation may be the raw material of knowledge, we must have compared it with sensations both like and unlike it, and when I say that we must have made the comparison I imply, as Prof. Murray plainly sees, that the sensation has been previously related to us the knowing subjects. In brief, without questioning the value of Prof. Murray's discussion of association and comparison, we hold firstly, that sensations though more simple than perceptions from the point of view of analysis, are equally with perceptions mental phenomena; and secondly, that in order that such sensation should be the mental state it is, thought must have compared it with other sensations both similar and dissimilar, or in the phraseology of Prof. Murray thought has used the laws of association and comparison. This conclusion does not affect the fact that sensation is analytically the simplest form of knowledge and it, moreover, holds good quite irrespective of what view may be taken of the growth of consciousness in the individual. Sensation as it is for animals, or as it may have been for man, before he was conscious, is not the same with sensation as it is for consciousness, for as Prof. Murray has shown, the introduction of the new factor, thought, essentially alters the product. The dualism indi-