

Cruise Missile Testing

The developing technologies on the cruise which are taking place in the United States today are making for much greater speed, much longer range, and a more accurate guidance system. Above all and most important, the advance cruise missile will embody a radar evading stealth technology that will make it very difficult, if not impossible, to detect cruise missiles. Some 2,300 of these ACMs will be, it is expected, produced and deployed by the early 1990s.

Also in the works now and expected to be deployed by the mid to late 1990s is the ultimate sophistication in cruise missile development, namely, the supersonic cruise missile which is absolutely impossible, one would think, to detect, a cruise missile which will also incorporate even more enhanced stealth technology, even greater speed, and even greater range.

When we read about these developments, which are fully known, we think of the constant build-up and the modernization that have taken place, going right through to the late 1990s, and we wonder whatever has happened to arms control. We wonder what the Government is thinking about. So far at least it has given only a military response to the modernization of the cruise. It has signed on to the U.S. Air Defence Initiative which is supporting the development of a supersonic cruise of a first strike capability. We have apparently gladly signed on, Mr. Speaker. We will, therefore, undoubtedly be testing the advance cruise missiles.

● (1410)

Last year the Minister said we had not yet been requested to test the missile with stealth technology, but left the clear implication that Canada wanted to be in on everything related to these U.S. developments and that we would get involved by implication in the cruise missile modernization program by testing the advanced cruise missile. That has been our response. The Government has not even tried to argue that this would enhance stable deterrence because it knows perfectly well it will not. It is really incredible that the Government has not at least paid lip service to another response to this modernization program, namely, an arms control response.

The Canadian Government said it places arms control and disarmament high on its agenda and strongly supports the INF agreements recently reached between Secretary General Gorbachev and President Reagan. Yet it is literally saying nothing about cut-backs in cruise missiles in our cruise missile arsenal. It has said nothing at all about the importance of pursuing negotiated cuts in cruise missile arsenals rather than the superpowers engaging in activities that encourage enhancement and modernization of cruise missile arsenals. As far as I can determine, the Government has not pressed upon the superpowers the absolute necessity of including cuts on both sides in cruise missile arsenals at the START talks in Geneva.

I asked in the House whether or not we had made written representations, and got a very wishy-washy answer from the Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney) to the effect that he often writes President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev.

Obviously, Canada, even more than in relation to INF in Europe—in relation to both air and sea-launched cruise missiles—should have been aggressively pursuing negotiated cuts. It would appear at the moment from what I have read that there are not in the present START negotiations, that is to say, the negotiations to cut back on strategic nuclear arsenals any provisions restricting the modernization of cruise missiles, let alone the arsenals themselves. I specifically mention the modernization and, above all, the enormous increase in the speed of the missiles and the radar avoiding technology, the stealth technology, as being of the utmost importance in negotiations to reduce arsenals. It is very often the case that simply reducing arsenals only gives more room for modernization, as it is called, of other arsenals. One feels one almost has a free hand to take all the research moneys, skills and defence dollars and put them into the development, including the testing in which Canada is complicit and the ultimate deployment of such modernized weapons. I am speaking again of the cruise missile particularly, that we are really undoing the steps that have been taken. For example, in the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces, we are simply transferring the problem.

Mr. Prud'homme: Hear, hear!

Ms. Jewett: Canada has not said anything about this. Canadian public opinion wants Canada to be out of the testing of cruise missiles. Today, 54 per cent of the population, up from 45 per cent a few years ago, say that tests should not be allowed, that we should, as this motion suggests, give notice now. Canadian public opinion wants to see all the response to the modernization of the cruise missile, not the testing of it, not the testing of the new radar avoiding cruise missiles but rather the pressing on the superpowers, in all fora for cuts in cruise missile arsenals and the elimination of cruise missile modernization. The Canadian public wants to see the end of cruise missile testing.

Mrs. Barbara Sparrow (Calgary South): Mr. Speaker, the motion before us requests the Government of Canada to consider the advisability of terminating U.S.A. cruise missile testing in Canada. I would like to explain why the Government does not view the termination of cruise missile testing as advisable and why such a termination would actually work against the mutual reinforcing nature of defence and arms control policies. While we will spare no effort to promote practical arms control and disarmament measures, we will be equally vigilant in maintaining a defence commitment that will serve as an effective deterrent to aggression. Let us not live under any illusion. To abandon our contribution to a viable nuclear and conventional deterrent on the part of the West would not improve the prospects for equitable arms control and disarmament measures.

Ms. Jewett: It has nothing to do with deterrents.

Mrs. Sparrow: What incentive would the East have to reduce its nuclear or conventional forces if the West were