

reply submitted yesterday by the leader of the C.C.F. party. We felt at that time, as indeed the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggarr (Mr. Coldwell) said yesterday, that the passage of such a formal resolution of condemnation in the United Nations at that particular moment, when we had just received the second reply from Peking, would be both premature and unwise. If it were not followed by some action against China, it would throw into high relief the sharp limitations of United Nations resolutions. On the other hand, if it were followed by the imposition of sanctions, however modest against China, the risk of the west becoming involved in a war with China would be increased; and we were and are determined, along with other delegations, to do everything we can to prevent a war with China, whether limited or unlimited. We were all also loath at that moment to support a formal condemnation of China in the United Nations because we felt that the clarification which had come from Peking afforded some possibility of satisfactory negotiation with that regime. There was also a real danger at that time that a resolution of condemnation in the United Nations, in the terms of the United States' resolution as it stood at that time, would unnecessarily highlight and exaggerate differences of view between the Asians and the western members of the free world and indeed bring about a formal division between the members of the western world in the United Nations. Nevertheless there could be no doubt that the Chinese Communists had engaged in aggression and had attacked the forces of the United Nations; and in the last resort we could not refuse, as I saw it, to recognize that situation in a resolution of condemnation if that resolution were pressed to a vote, if it stated the actual position fairly, if it were not couched in unnecessarily provocative terms, and if it included within it provision for negotiation. In all of my discussions with the Indian delegate at the United Nations--and I have had a great many with him in the last two or three weeks-- I made that position perfectly clear to him; and he at no time was under any misunderstanding or misapprehension about the Canadian position.

Last week we had two resolutions before us at the United Nations and we were faced with a decision as to what we should do about them. We realized that that decision might indeed have far-reaching consequences. The first of these two resolutions was the Asian resolution providing for a seven-power conference in which both the U.S.S.R. and communist China would be represented, a seven-power conference not only for political discussions but for cease-fire discussions, and a seven-power conference the terms of the invitation to which seemed to us to be couched in a form which might have made possible protracted discussion with Peking before the conference ever met. For that reason we did not find that resolution satisfactory, and in a speech last Friday January 26^A we suggested certain points which we thought would remove the danger from the Asian resolution if those points could have been included in it, because they would have laid down in a resolution a concrete and definite programme for talks without delay. In those points we even suggested a date for the convocation

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