

state, sanctions have often been applied in a vindictive manner, intended to inflict the maximum amount of pain on the target without regard to the likely effectiveness and humanitarian implications of such a strategy.

The discussion also emphasized the key role played by public opinion in motivating states to "do something" in response to perceived atrocities abroad. In the sense that sanctions satisfy the demands of domestic audiences, they can be viewed in an important sense as "successful" regardless of their impact on target states. The prevailing "pain equals gain" mentality, combined with the force of public opinion, means that it is sometimes difficult to persuade states to adopt a more nuanced approach when imposing sanctions, or to dissuade them from using sanctions when other, less dramatic strategies might be more constructive.

The rationality of sanctions policy is also impaired by the Council's failure to tailor its actions to the type of regime which it is attempting to influence (e.g., sanctions which prove influential when employed against a fragile democracy may prove ineffective against a strong dictatorship.) This irrationality is compounded by political cleavages among Council members, which make it difficult to form a consensus around strong measures, or to arrive at a concerted strategy which employs sanctions as part of a broader diplomatic *démarche*.

Participants also observed several recent trends in the Council's attitude toward sanctions, trends which are germane to the issue of sanctions reform. First, even as instances of sanctions proliferate - as do the issues to which they are applied - there is an increasing sense of pessimism regarding their effectiveness. In addition, there is growing interest (at least at the rhetorical level) in making sanctions more humane. Accordingly, states have begun to view