

This informal text was rejected by the NAM and is not part of the rolling text. A subsequent effort by Canada (within the Western Group and after the Jan95 Experts Group meeting) to encourage the reintroduction of this informal text in the early stages of the RevCon has been rebuffed by a number of Western countries. They believe, essentially for tactical reasons, that it is best to start with the harder-line Western proposal and move to a compromise later in the course of the RevCon. It should be noted that some other Western countries were not wholly supportive of the Chair's informal text, believing that it was introduced too early in the CCW review process.

CANADIAN POSITION:

Canada supports the internationally agreed principle that adequate and effective verification is an essential element of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and that this applies to the CCW. As the amended CCW may involve even stronger arms control elements (eg. transfers) than its present provisions, this view seems doubly relevant. Our first preference, therefore, is for a strong and intrusive verification regime along the lines of the Western proposal. Fundamentally, if we believe that the strength of the verification regime should be commensurate with the importance attached to compliance with the agreement.

However, in view of the hardline taken by some NAM countries, we have judged that an evolutionary approach to verification is more likely to succeed. We believe it is more important to gain agreement to incorporate the principle of effective verification into an amended CCW at the RevCon, together with a regular review procedure for the Convention. At subsequent reviews of the CCW, it is hoped that further strengthening of the verification regime might be possible. This is the underlying rationale of the compromise text that Canada prepared for Amb. Molanders involving an opt-out clause. As parties gained more experience with the operation of the compromise verification regime, it was hoped they would be more amenable to its application to internal conflicts. Another possibility might be a Special Conference after the RevCon to explore expanding the verification regime.

Canada should assume a leading role on the verification issue at the RevCon. It should actively support the Western proposal and a regular review process for the CCW. However, the Canadian delegation will have in its back pocket possible compromise language on verification should it be necessary, as appears likely.

POSITIONS OF OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS/GROUPS ON THE ISSUE:

Amb. Molanders has indicated that the hardline NAM are adamantly opposed to inclusion of verification in the amended CCW. He would be happy to re-introduce a modified version of his compromise text. His position is constrained by the unwillingness of some Western countries to go along and by the fact that the EU common position favours effective verification. Amb. Molanders believes that