

Vietnamese administration, and that the ruling party in North Vietnam has assisted its agents in South Vietnam in attempting to attain this objective. I think I hardly need underline what these conclusions mean for the theory one often hears developed that the war in the South Vietnam is essentially an internal revolt.

#### DEFENCE OF CANADIAN STATEMENT

Both the Indian and Polish representatives on the Commission have questioned the status of the extracts of the legal committee's report quoted in the Canadian statement. I cannot agree that a document which has been carefully prepared by a properly-constituted committee of the Commission, acting on a majority basis, in pursuance of Commission instructions and on the basis of material referred to it by the Commission, has no status.

The Polish representative has also questioned our right to quote from and append some recent South Vietnamese allegations, which were directed in the normal manner to the Commission for consideration. The allegations concerned do not, of course, pretend to be Commission conclusions. According to these complaints, however, large quantities of arms, munitions and supplies of Communist origin, and large numbers of military personnel, have been steadily infiltrated into South Vietnam from the north by land and sea, and secret bases and related installations have been established by the Viet Cong with the support of North Vietnam. To omit reference to them in current Commission reports would imply that the Commission had not been apprised of them or that it was totally ignoring the major complaints of one of the two parties to the Geneva agreement. The Commission's silence since 1962 on the problem of subversion does not mean there has been any change for the better. On the contrary, judging by the evidence presented to the Commission (and there is a large quantity of material of more recent origin now being reviewed by the Commission's legal experts), it seems obvious that the hostile activities of the Hanoi regime have been steadily increasing.

#### INSIDIOUS AGGRESSION

Our independent observer position in Vietnam has brought us face to face with an insidious form of aggression, with which the free world has yet to devise adequate means of dealing. We have seen a new political entity emerge from colonial status only to be forced into a cruel struggle for survival against hostile pressures beyond its control. In whatever form aggression manifests itself, it must be recognized as such and it must be stopped, not least because we cannot afford to let the practitioners of this technique come to the conclusion that it pays dividends.

This is surely the basic issue at stake in Vietnam today, and it is of vital interest to all members of the international community. This is what we, by virtue of our membership on the International Commission, have established as the lesson of the past ten years. I think it is important for all of us to have this fact clear in our minds before we go on to the next and most vital task, which is to attempt to

restore peace to that troubled area. And here I must stress that I do not believe that the answer which all concerned could accept lies either in escalation and all-out war, or, on the other hand, surrender to Communist pressures.

#### CANADA'S IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE

We are all deeply concerned with the implications for world peace, no less than for the future of the Vietnamese people, of the continuation of the present situation. It contains the seeds of escalation and the dangers - all too evident to us today - of an open conflict of stark and terrifying proportions. As I have indicated on many occasions, we seek a peaceful and equitable solution, and our efforts are certainly being directed to that end. This is our immediate objective, to avoid the inevitable consequences of escalation. Clearly and firmly, but without panic or alarm, we must make our concern known to all - I repeat all - the direct participants in this conflict, always remembering that conditions on the ground, the actual deployment of power, will have an important influence on the willingness of the parties concerned to modify their policies. Only if all concerned are prepared to face up to their responsibilities and obligations, and only if all concerned are prepared to exercise the restraint for which we and other nations have appealed, can we take the next step toward the peaceful settlement which is our ultimate objective.

Finally, a satisfactory solution would be one which adequately protects and guarantees the independence of people who wish to remain independent. The 1954 Geneva agreements were designed to end war but failed to create a durable settlement and lasting peace. Canada has become acutely aware of the painful shortcomings of the 1954 settlement through more than ten years of experience in Indochina, where we have been forced to observe the slow erosion of the terms of a cease-fire agreement.

#### IDEA OF GUARANTEED NEUTRALITY

Perhaps a new and better arrangement could be achieved by some form of guaranteed neutrality, or through a stronger supervisory and policing mechanism, capable of preventing aggressive interference from outside. As the Prime Minister has pointed out, this is surely an international responsibility. To discharge it, the lessons of the past indicate that there will be required an international presence involving more authority and more freedom of action than have obtained in the past, and this must be balanced by a mutual acceptance of this machinery and a readiness to co-operate in using it. It is clear that to be charged with supervision yet to be powerless to check the slow erosion of a settlement is not enough.

#### CHOOSING A FRAMEWORK

It is not easy, under present circumstances, to define the framework within which new and stronger mechanisms could be brought into being. While the United Nations might be considered as providing an obvious basis on which a new approach might be build up, attitudes thus far have tended to lessen the acceptability of this framework and the chances of its being successfully used. It cannot, however, be

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