

lead to successful outcomes. Some supporting conditions may be more amenable to influence than others. A corollary deriving from the importance of these supporting conditions and the limited ability to influence some of them is that the timing of confidence building initiatives matters very much. Confidence building should not be viewed as a panacea, capable of improving antagonistic security relations before potential participants are ready for constructive change.

#### 5) Encourage Development of Expert Groups and Discussion Forums:

Another important policy implication associated with the transformation view is the need for interested parties to encourage epistemic community growth. Including governmental links with this community and the participation of military and defence officials is critical. The presence of an effective transnational epistemic community appears to be an extremely constructive factor in initiating and structuring the confidence building process. A group of recognized experts can provide interested policy makers who are dissatisfied with *status quo* security relationships with a useful, new understanding of "the problem" and a promising way of addressing it. The process of encouraging national and regional experts groups can also help policy makers to recognize emerging dissatisfaction with *status quo* security policy approaches and in this way encouraging epistemic community development can indirectly affect the emergence of some other supporting conditions.

Expert communities as well as governmental officials require appropriate forums -- both formal and informal -- for discussion and interaction. This is another supporting condition that seems likely to be amenable to deliberate influence, either by potential participants or by interested third parties.

#### 6) A Role for Interested Third Parties:

There is a special role for interested third parties, particularly in encouraging the development of genuine epistemic communities. International organizations such as the United Nations, research organizations, and interested governments with some competence in this area might make important contributions to confidence building thinking and its promotion across borders. They might, for example, actively promote workshops and seminars where experts and government officials can develop a keener understanding of how confidence building works. They might also help acquaint interested states and regional experts with various cost-effective, operational approaches such as cooperative monitoring that can play a useful role in supporting both traditional and non-traditional confidence building efforts.

As confidence building becomes better understood in a variety of application contexts, it may be appropriate to revise our understanding of it. Each new application of confidence building may differ in key ways, obliging us to reconsider what we once thought was essential to its basic character. The transformation view is relatively well-suited to facilitating such revision because it places confidence building within a broader institutional framework and separates CBMs from the processes associated with their development. One attractive possibility is the case of efforts to expand our thinking on confidence building to encompass non-traditional security regimes that already exhibit cooperative characteristics ("confidence expanding"). *Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View* is intended as a constructive step to help move this on-going process of understanding confidence building forward.