

but neither proposal offers a formula which would provide equally deep cuts in the total number of long- and intermediate-range nuclear charges. It will also be noted that, in the best of the outcomes offered by the 'deep reductions', the respective sides together would continue to hold approximately 16,000 strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

In response to the second question, the respective proposals on long-range ballistic missiles, particularly land-based ICBMs, suggest that, if considered in isolation, negotiation could bridge the difference. Insofar as ICBMs constitute the principal counter-force problem, convergence in this area is important. It has also been noted that lower ceilings on counter-force capable weapons can severely restrict counter-force options and, therefore, dispositions. On the other hand, it is unlikely that land-based ballistic missiles could be separated from other issues such as separate bomber ceilings and the counter-force capabilities of the Trident D-5. A complex negotiation which allowed both sides greater freedom to reduce and restructure their strategic forces is feasible, however, particularly if the problem of the intermediate-range forces is dealt with separately, as now appears to be likely.

Finally, the observations above prompt a general comment about the prospects for arms control agreements on strategic weapons. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that, in terms of strategic weapons, the period between the deployment by the Soviet Union of its modern weapons (the SS-18, the SS-19, the SS-N-20), and the future deployment of the Trident D-5 is one in which rough parity has existed. Insofar as rough parity is judged to be a constructive context for arms control negotiations (a proposition not necessarily accepted by all observers), the actual balance of strategic forces is now conducive to negotiations. It may not be too great a leap from the evidence, therefore, to suggest that since the technical elements appear to be negotiable, the critical factor is likely to be political will.