This approval was given on the following day, when it was agreed that each government should take the necessary steps to secure approval of a protocol to the Treaty effecting the necessary modifications to Article 6, which has to do with the territory covered by the Treaty. Five days later a memorandum to Cabinet asked that Mr. Wilgress be authorized to sign the protocol, and that a resolution be introduced to Parliament as soon as possible after signature of the protocol, approving of its ratification by the Government. On September 26 Cabinet approved these recommendations, and Mr. Wilgress signed the protocol on October 17. It was not until five days later, however, that the Danish deputy added his signature, as his Government insisted that it could not act until the Danish Parliament had given approval.

The lengthy gap between approval in Ottawa and signature in London raised some irritating problems of ratifications. It had been the Minister's view, which was endorsed by Cabinet on October 13, that Canada should postpone action until the three governments principally concerned, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, had ratified the Protocol. He expressed this opinion in a debate on foreign policy in the House of Commons on October 22, although it was qualified by saying that "it might be desirable". Mr. Bliss of the U.S. Embassy sent a letter saying that the State Department was "rather unhappy" about this statement. He explained that, because of the unfortunate delays in London, Congress had adjourned before signature of the Protocol had been completed and could therefore take no action until it reassembled in January. There was no difficulty anticipated in securing senatorial approval, but, if Canada could take action in advance of the United States but after either the United Kingdom or France or both had obtained approval, it would be "very helpful in keeping up the momentum and influencing other members of NATO to complete the requisite Parliamentary action".(1) It must have given Mr. Ritchie some satisfaction to remind Mr. Bliss in a second interview of the background of the situation and to comment that it "would certainly seem a very extraordinary procedure for the Canadian Government to press ahead with her ratification of the Protocol before the Governments which had primary responsibility for the mitter". As Mr. Wrong was told: "This United States attempt to push us out ahead of themselves seems to us, in view of the whole history of this question, to be somewhat preposterous". But Mr. Bliss was assured that Canada would not be the cause of any unnecessary delay.

HANDING KANDUNG KALANDAN PENGKAN PENGK

While Mr. Pearson was in Paris for the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, he had an opportunity of discussing the question further with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden. Since Parliament might not reassemble after the Christmas recess until February, it was possible that all other NATO states would have completed ratification by that time, leaving Canada in the invidious position of holding up the invitation to Greece and Turkey. As he cabled Mr. Heeney on November 9, 1951, he was therefore considering Parliament being asked to take action during the closing days of the session in late December. Cabinet was informed of this proposed change in timing on December 6 by the Prime Minister, and agreed to it. Accordingly, as the final item of business in the session the House of Commons approved of adherence to the protocol on December 29, 1951. The debate was marked by cordial references to Greece and Turkey from all the speakers. The Minister did not explain, and was not asked, why Canadian action was preceding that of the United States. His main justification for the protocol was that its strengthened peace by semoving uncertainty, and that

<sup>(1)</sup> The State Department spoke on similar lines to Mr. Wrong in Washington.