

the end results. In a multinational process such as the CSCE, which relies on consensus, the political influence of individual states remains an important factor, particularly if they are able to gain support for their positions from other participants. Thus in the final analysis a 'dyktat' by any state is not possible.

Stockholm will not prevent those states wishing to pursue political objectives by the use or threat of force from doing so. A political price, however, will have to be paid by a delinquent state and the agreed CSBMs can assist in providing additional warning so that military countermeasures could be taken by those feeling threatened.

Though modest, the Stockholm Document is a first comprehensive and concrete step towards increasing political stability and security in Europe. That is not to say that confidence-building stops at Stockholm; on the contrary, much remains to be done and a follow-on conference with the same or an expanded mandate would be a logical next step forward.

NOTES

1. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the USSR, the UK, the USA and Yugoslavia.
2. At 22:56 hours on 19 September, it was necessary to stop the clock in accordance with CSCE practices, in order to finish the work at the agreed deadline. The document was finally adopted at 11:35 hours on 22 September.
3. *Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting 1980 of the Representatives of the Participating States of the CSCE*, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, Madrid, 1983, p. 38.
4. *Document of the Stockholm Conference on CSBM and Disarmament in Europe*, Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE, Stockholm, 1986, pp. 23-40.
5. Z. Brzezinski, *The Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s*, Plenary Paper I, IISS Annual Conference, Ottawa, 1983, p. 26.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
7. B. Brodie, *War and Politics*, New York, 1973, p. 342.
8. R.A.D. Ford, *The Legacy of Yalta*, Maclean's, 11 February 1985, pp. 16-17.
9. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, *Peace*, New York, 1983, pp. 624-625.

10. *NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons*, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1984, fig. 2, p. 8.
11. Madrid Mandate, p. 38.
12. R.S. Dirnecker, *Between Helsinki and Belgrade: A Balance Sheet of CSCE*, Strategic Review, Vol. V, No. 4, Washington, 1977, pp. 74-83.
13. *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act*, Helsinki, 1975, pp. 85-87.
14. M. Dobrosielski, *CSCE: A Polish View*, Warsaw, 1976, p. 18.
15. NATO, SC1, 24 January 1984; Romania, SC2, 25 January 1984; NNA, SC3, 9 March 1984; USSR, SC4, 8 May 1984; and Malta, SC5, 8 November 1984.
16. Madrid Mandate, p. 38.
17. Madrid Mandate, p. 38.
18. An all-embracing term meant to solve the definition problem of 'movement,' 'exercise' and 'manoeuvre'.
19. Experts' meetings on: *The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes* in Berne, March 1984; *Human Rights* in Ottawa, April 1984; *Human Contacts*, Berne, April 1986.
20. The Communiqué of the "Budapest Appeal", 10-11 June 1986.
21. Communiqué on the *Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States*, Budapest, 11 June 1986, Section VI, p. 13.
22. The MBFR area of reductions consists of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries for NATO and that of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia for the WTO.
23. *Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control*, Press Communiqué, Brussels, 11 December 1986.



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