

monitoring procedures of decreasing control with which are associated lists of the chemicals to be monitored. The chemicals would be selected on the basis of criteria of which toxicity category is only one. To some extent this approach has already been followed in developing the Guidelines for Schedule [1] (CD 881, p.112-113).

The ambiguous treatment of STLCs in the current text would strongly suggest that the almost exclusive reliance on the toxicity criterion in the definitions as well as in the elaboration of the schedules under Article VI is increasingly inappropriate, and that therefore, the definition of chemical weapons should be developed further to incorporate explicitly other criteria relating to intent, suitable route of entry, or weaponizability.

The title of Schedule [1] should be changed to clearly indicate that those chemicals are controlled because they have been used or stockpiled for chemical weapons purposes or have characteristics that make them readily usable as chemical weapons. In other words, those STLCs included are listed as chemical weapons not only on the basis of toxicity but also on the basis of additional criteria. This, of course, means that there will have to be additional provisions for the listing of the remaining STLCs and other toxic chemicals of particular concern to the Convention.

As it stands in CD 881, Schedule [2] is devoted to key precursors and so is related solely to potential production of Schedule [1] chemicals. As is currently being discussed in Working Group 4, it would be even more useful if it were to be extended to encompass other chemicals that pose a particularly serious risk to the Convention e.g., other potential agents, penetrants, etc., and other STLCs which do not appear on Schedule [1]. In the latter instance it is not necessarily the chemical itself but its production facility that would be of concern to the Convention.

Chart IV shows a proposed division of STLCs into those currently known to have chemical weapon utility, with the addition of potential chemical weapons based on some appropriate criteria, as falling into Schedule [1]. Other STLCs (known or upon discovery) would enter a revised Schedule [2]. This means that these STLCs would be monitored under a data reporting regime with random inspections that would be directed mainly at the production facilities in order to ensure that prohibited chemicals are not being produced.