

ready to consider the possibility of organizing, as has been proposed by Sweden, the exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses with the establishment of appropriate international data centres on the same basis as is envisaged in respect of the seismic data exchange". This and other statements suggest to us that there is now broad support in principle for this proposal which, if implemented, would further strengthen a future nuclear test ban treaty.

Document CD/507 describes the results of recent research at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR), which is one of the world's largest seismological observatories and which has recorded high-quality seismic data in digital form for about 70,000 earthquakes and more than 500 presumed nuclear explosions since 1970. A monthly summary of recorded seismic events is regularly distributed to seismological agencies in 25 countries. I would like to stress that all data and research results from NORSAR are openly available to the world's seismological community.

As described in document CD/507, NORSAR has currently under construction a new experimental small-aperture array named NORESS, which will be operational in the autumn of 1984. In contrast to existing arrays, which are primarily designed to achieve optimum performance for seismic events in the range of 3,000-10,000 km, the purpose of NORESS is to develop methods for detection and location of seismic events at so-called local and regional distances, which are distances of less than 3,000 km. Stations of this type would be of particular importance in detecting and locating events too weak to be observed at distances beyond 3,000 km. Work of this nature could have important implications for improved detection of weak seismic events as well as for seismic source identification. As the verification issues have proved to be the main problem in connection with a comprehensive test ban, we believe that further development in this field will have positive effects on the possibilities to make progress towards a comprehensive test ban. In this respect the exchange of seismic waveform data or so-called Level II data is of special importance as well.

Norway will continue her research in the field of both selection, handling, transportation and analysis of chemical agents and seismic verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban with a view to contributing further to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Norway devotes considerable resources in these two fields, first and foremost because of the urgency of the questions of a total ban on chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The Conference on Disarmament, as the only negotiating body for global disarmament questions has a decisive role to play in order to bring about progress in both of these vital fields.

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The problem with permitted uses of toxic chemicals is that they pose a potential for misuse and a corresponding problem for verification. We all want peaceful uses of chemicals to continue, but none of us wants such activities to be used for clandestine chemical weapons production. This is a very serious problem, since many chemicals that are used in industry can also be effectively used in chemical warfare. Thus, we recognize that a certain degree of regulation of permitted activities will be necessary in any convention banning chemical weapons. The United States proposal for such regulations, and their implementation, is presented in article III and annex III of our draft convention. In paragraph 1 of article III we propose that a party may only possess or use chemicals for permitted activities in types and quantities consistent with such purposes. Thus, if anyone, whether linked to the government or not, purports to be engaged in permitted activities but possesses chemicals inappropriate to that activity or in amounts in excess of that legitimately needed for the activity, then that would be a violation of