

C122(A84)

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Proposal Abstract C122(A84)

1. Arms Control Problem:

- (a) Conventional weapons - ground forces
- (b) Regional arms control - Europe

2. Verification Type:

- (a) On-site Inspection - selective
- control posts
- (b) Remote sensors - aerial
- (c) International exchange of information

3. Source:

Starr, Richard F. "The MBFR Process and Its Prospects". Orbis 27, no. 4 (Winter 1984).

4. Summary:

This article reviews the current status and prospects for the MBFR talks - the discussions for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe. The central problem is identified as being the current numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact forces over those of NATO, and the concomitant inability to reach an agreement on this data. The Soviet Union contends that no such disparity exists, asserting instead that the West has over estimated the size and strength of Warsaw Pact troops.

A second problem relates to the associated measures in a reduction of forces which would allow for verification and confidence-building. These associated measures are as follows:

- (1) the notification of out-of-garrison activity;
- (2) posting of observers at these activities;
- (3) notification of major ground force military movements;
- (4) the allowance of a certain number of on-site inspections in the area from ground and air;
- (5) the establishment and posting of observers at permanent entry/exit points;
- (6) exchange of information on forces to be withdrawn; and
- (7) the prohibition of interference with national technical means of verification.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union is unwilling to permit intrusive methods, and there is a "basic disagreement on the geographic extension" of the first two measures. Thus, it is concluded that the prospects for MBFR are not good because it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union will be willing to substantially reduce their forces or agree to the requisite verification measures.