

J95.1(A85)

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Proposal Abstract J95.1(A85)

1. Arms Control Problem:

- (a) Nuclear weapons - ballistic missiles  
- cruise missiles
- (b) Conventional weapons - ships

2. Verification Type:

- (a) Remote sensors
- (b) On-site inspection - selective

3. Source:

Byers, R.B. "Verification and Seapower: Soviet-American Perspectives on Compliance". In The Denuclearisation of the Oceans, pp. 212-228. Edited by R.B. Byers. Beckenham, England: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986.

4. Summary:

Mechanisms and structures used to determine whether all parties comply with the provisions of an agreement are a concern in all arms control negotiations. While on the surface the tasks relating to compliance and verification appear straightforward, they are complex and contentious because of three interrelated problems (in ascending order of importance): conceptual, technical and political. Technical issues relating to naval weapons (such as the total numbers of sea-based nuclear platforms, their range in size, their mobility and the dual capability of most platforms) suggest that NTMs will need to be supplemented by cooperative measures.

The author believes that "in the final analysis the real problems are neither conceptual or technical -- rather they are political" (p. 216). He reviews Soviet and American views on compliance and verification at some length concluding that the USSR has accepted the principle that in some circumstances cooperative measure are required to verify compliance.

A concern to both superpowers is the possibility that non-compliance could result in advantages to one side. Four such advantages are identified and related to naval arms control:

- (1) Demonstration advantages are ones which have political implications but no military significance. An example is trespassing into agreed SSBN sanctuaries. Cooperative measures would be required to ensure that such advantages do not become the norm.
- (2) R & D advantages would result if a party circumvents limits on SLCM ranges or flight tests of new classes of SLBMs. Cooperative measures could greatly reduce dangers of R & D advantages.
- (3) Balance advantages result from violations which affect military capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively. Deployment of nuclear SLCMs could lead to balance advantages if compliance measures are limited to NTMs. Limits on sea-based tactical nuclear platforms and specific types of nuclear systems would also require some form of cooperative measures.